DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 356 984 SO 022 775

TITLE	Roots of Japanese Behavior. Proceedings of the Symposium (Honolulu, Hawaii, October 13-14, 1989).
INSTITUTION	East-West Center, Honolulu, HI.; Hawaii Univ., Honolulu. Center for Japanese Society.; Japan-America Society of Hawaii, Honolulu.
PUB DATE	[90]
NOTE	104p.
AVAILABLE FROM	Japan-America Society of Hawaii, P.O. Box 1412, Honolulu, HI 96806 ($5).
PUB TYPE	Collected Works - Conference Proceedings (021) -- Reports - Descriptive (141)
EDRS PRICE	MF01/PC05 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	Asian History; Cultural Background; *Cultural Context; *Cultural Differences; Cultural Images; *Cultural Influences; Foreign Countries; Foreign Culture
IDENTIFIERS	*Japan; *Japanese Culture

ABSTRACT

Technologically the contemporary Japanese are among the most advanced people in the world. Initially, it was from the West that they acquired modern technology and science, but technology and science have not bridged the cultural gap that exists between Japanese and Americans. Both belong to democratic, capitalistic societies and they share many cultural values, but there are differences in their patterns of behavior which often are the source of misunderstanding and frustration. This document contains papers and responses from a symposium that examined the roots of Japanese behavior from various perspectives. The presentations and responses include: "Japanese Social Structures: Achievement and Modernization" (H. Kato, response T. S. Lebra); "Japan's Response to the Modern World" (M. Jansen, response R. Sakai); "Philosophical/Religious Aspects of Japanese Behavior" (T. Kasulis, response G. Tanabe); "How They Learn: Cultural Values and Education in Japan" (M. White, response v. Kobayashi); "Japanese Internationalization in Historical Perspective" (K. Kabayama; response E. Seidensticker). (DB)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED356984

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

☒ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

ROOTS OF JAPANESE BEHAVIOR

The Japan-America Society of Honolulu

in cooperation with

The East-West Center

The Center for Japanese Studies, University of Hawaii

SC 02775

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
KATHLEEN LATIFIAN
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

ROOTS OF
JAPANESE BEHAVIOR

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM

October 13-14, 1989

Jefferson Hall, East-West Center

The Japan-America Society of Honolulu

The East-West Center

The Center for Japanese Studies
University of Hawaii

Generous support for the symposium
including the publication of the proceedings
was provided by:

Daiei/Equitable,
the Owners of Ala Moana Center
Honolulu, Hawaii

CONTENTS

Preface v

Foreword vii

I Japanese Social Structures: Achievement and Modernization, *Hidetoshi Kato* 11

Response by *Takie Sugiyama Lebra* 17

II Japan's Response to the Modern World, *Marius B. Jansen* 23

Response by *Robert K. Sakai* 32

III Philosophical/Religious Aspects of Japanese Behavior, *Thomas P. Kasulis* 39

Response by *George J. Tanabe* 55

IV How They Learn: Cultural Values and Education in Japan, *Merry I. White* 64

Response by *Victor N. Kobayashi* 78

V Japanese Internationalization in Historical Perspective, *Koichi Kabayama* 91

Response by *Edward G. Seidensticker* 97

Participants 102

PREFACE

The Japan-America Society of Honolulu, carrying out its mission of providing a platform for a discussion of issues facing Japan and the United States, has conducted many meetings over the years and has featured outstanding scholars, economists, politicians, and commentators. Nearly all these presentations have to be limited to brief talks after breakfast, lunch, or dinner, followed by a few questions from the audience. There is hardly sufficient time to explore a topic in depth, nor is there an opportunity for an extensive dialog. To be sure, even such brief meetings are necessary and productive, and we continue to offer them, since they do introduce significant speakers and topics to a large audience and they do contribute toward a better understanding of the Japan-American relationship.

To give us an opportunity to delve more thoroughly into the topic of "Roots of Japanese Behavior" the Japan-America Society of Honolulu, in cooperation with the East-West Center and the Center for Japanese Studies at the University of Hawaii, decided to conduct a two-day conference on October 13 and 14, 1989. We invited scholars, both from Japan and from the United States, to present papers and to engage in a dialog. From Japan we invited Professor Koichi Kabayama, a historian at the University of Tokyo, and Professor Hidetoshi Kato, a sociologist who is currently Director of the National Institute of Multi-Media Education in Tokyo. From the mainland United States we invited Professor Merry White of Boston University, a specialist on Japanese early childhood education; Professor Marius Jansen, a scholar of Japanese history at Princeton University; and Professor Thomas Kasulis, a professor of philosophy dealing with Japanese thought and religion at Northland College, Ashland, Wisconsin. Respondents from the University of Hawaii were Professor Robert Sakai, Professor Emeritus of Asian History; Professor Victor Kobayashi, Dean of the University of Hawaii Summer Session and specialist in Japanese education; Professor Takie Sugiyama Lebra, a scholar in the field of Japanese Social Cultural Anthropology; Professor Edward Seidensticker, affiliated with the Center for Japanese Studies at the University of Hawaii and Professor Emeritus of Japanese literature, Columbia University; and Professor George Tanabe, Professor of Religion with focus on Buddhism. Our aim was to illustrate the roots of Japanese behavior from various perspectives and to allow for

an exchange of opinions. The conference, which took place in the Keoni Auditorium of Jefferson Hall of the East-West Center, included members of the Japan-America Society, the East-West Center community and members of the Center for Japanese Study at the University of Hawaii. Lively discussion followed each presentation.

We acknowledge with gratitude the corporate sponsorship of Daiei/Equitable Hawaii Joint Venture, owners of the Ala Moana Center in Honolulu, whose support enabled us to organize the conference and produce this publication. We are also grateful for the encouragement and support of the Japan Foundation in Tokyo.

We also acknowledge the invaluable contributions of the conference planning committee which included Professors Patricia Steinhoff, Robert Sakai, and Victor Kobayashi of the University of Hawaii, Robert Hewett of the East-West Center, Bill Panttaja and Judith Yamauchi of the Japan-America Society of Honolulu.

These pages represent an edited transcription of the conference, preceded by introductory notes and comments by Professor Robert Sakai of the University of Hawaii. The Symposium rapporteur was Diana Bethel, Administrative Assistant with the Center for Japanese Studies. The proceedings were edited and prepared for desktop publishing by Judith Yamauchi, Associate Director of the Japan-America Society of Honolulu.

As the future of Japan and the United States becomes increasingly intertwined, we hope that this publication will help toward increased appreciation and understanding of the Japanese people.

Siegfried Ramler, Symposium Chairman
Japan-America Society of Honolulu

FOREWORD

Technologically the contemporary Japanese are among the most advanced people in the world. Initially it was from the West that they acquired modern technology and science, but technology and science have not bridged the cultural gap which exists between Japanese and Americans. Both belong to democratic, capitalistic societies and they share many cultural values, but there are differences in their patterns of behavior which often are the source of misunderstanding and frustration.

In the opening session of the conference on "The Roots of Japanese Behavior" Professor Kato stimulated lively discussion by suggesting that Japan has been an achievement-oriented society for many centuries. As evidence, he provided several examples of super achievers, such as Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who from humble beginnings, became the most powerful figure in Japan by the end of the sixteenth century, and of Ito Hirobumi, who from low-ranking samurai status, became an outstanding political leader, drafter of the Meiji constitution (1889), and multi-term prime minister. In more recent times several entrepreneurs qualify as Horatio Algers as they worked with minimal resources at the end of World War II and went on to become industrial and commercial giants.

The question was raised whether these examples reflected a society which facilitated individual achievement or whether their achievements were possible because they lived in times when social and political institutions were unsettled. Generally, until the mid-nineteenth century high positions were reserved for people of high status, and Professor Lebra reminded us that even today distinguished family lineage is often reason enough for placement in high posts.

Even in periods of stability, however, within their prescribed roles individuals have striven to excel in whatever they did whether as artists, artisans, scholars or samurai. As Professor Jansen observed, in the Tokugawa period (1603-1867) there were Japanese scholars who were confident that they were better informed about Confucianism than their Chinese counterparts, and in the Meiji period (1868-1912) there were Japanese converts who were determined to be more Christian than their Western mentors. In a recent article, anthropologist Robert J. Smith brings to our attention the observation of a Spanish-born gentleman who in 1609 expressed astonishment that "as for the bread made here (in Japan) it is no exaggeration to say that it is the best to be had anywhere in the

world..." (*Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 4, 1989, p. 719)

The aspiration to excel is not a trait confined to individuals. It is manifested also in the collective action of the people as a nation, as attested by Professor Jansen. In the mid-nineteenth century Western nations forced Japan to accept the "unequal treaties" (1858), which marked her as an inferior nation. But the country was not content to be treated like an inconsequential power. Her leaders harnessed the strong sense of national humiliation to build an industrial nation worthy of respect from the Western international community. By the end of the Meiji period the foreign powers had abolished the unequal treaties, and by 1919 Japan was a member of the Big Five at the Versailles Peace Conference. Unfortunately during the following two decades the breakdown of the international economic system, the attendant stresses and frustrations, and the increase of virulent racism and ultranationalism all combined to bring about the disaster of the Pacific War. In the post-World War II period Japan once again struggled to rebuild the nation and to regain international respect. In commercial, industrial, and financial terms her success has been amazing, so much so as to arouse great popular interest in the roots of Japanese behavior.

The Jesuit missionary Valignano noted in the late sixteenth century: "The Japanese are slow and deliberate in their dealings (with other people) and similarly they never display outward resentment or impatience even when they are inwardly much upset." On the other hand, he warned his confreres to be civil and polite "for they are so punctilious that they will not brook even a single harsh or impolite word...(and) if we press them too hard they will not tolerate it." (Quoted in C. R. Boxer, *The Christian Century in Japan*, 1951, pp. 82, 79).

It is apparent that some behavioral traits are deeply ingrained. However, as Professor White states, many factors influence the cultural shaping of the Japanese, not the least of which are the home, the school, and the community--environments which are different from those in the United States and which undergo change in Japan itself.

Contemporary Japanese high school students in comparison to their American counterparts do outstandingly well on academic tests. Professor White attributes this fact to the Japanese nurturing and educating process. She described how the young child gains self-confidence through a close dependency relationship with the mother. Later in school the child learns about cooperation by participation in problem-solving teams, a pedagogical device favored in Japan. Parental dedication, teacher

persuasiveness and community expectations each contribute to build up the student's motivation to study hard and "to be Japanese."

Professor Kasulis further advanced the inquiry into what it is to be "Japanese" by focusing on their preference for intimate human relationships, i.e., a relationship of implicit trust in which parties to the relationship understand each other's inner thoughts and feelings without need for verbalization. To turn this around, Japanese tend to be somewhat wary of close involvement with others who may not share their feelings and ideas. Recognizing this cultural bias, Japanese themselves often decry their unease in socializing with outsiders. As Valignano noted four centuries ago, Japanese tend to mask their feelings in dealing with foreigners, and they keep the latter at arm's length with politeness and formalities.

According to Professor Kasulis, Japanese place greater value on mutuality of feeling than on meeting of minds. They are more interested in the reliability of the person than the exactness of the contract. Perhaps these are some of the cultural values teachers seek to instil when they exhort their students to "be Japanese," "know your cultural roots," and be "culturally responsible."

The perception of uniqueness of Japanese culture was emphasized in Professor Kabayama's paper. This sense of national uniqueness can be a positive factor for solidifying national sentiment, or it can also be a "nobody can understand us" defensive mechanism in the face of outside criticism. The reverse side of intimacy is exclusiveness, as was brought out in the discussion. Overemphasis of cultural uniqueness may indeed inhibit internationalization.

A pessimistic conclusion would seem to flow from the depictions of the differences in Japanese and American behavioral patterns. Professor Seidensticker suggested that every country is unique, and Japan should not single herself out as uniquely unique. It may be added that there is nothing inherently wrong in being unique. On the positive side a unique culture should be able to make valuable contributions to other societies. Moreover, as cautioned by Professor White, we should not assume that Japanese cultural behavior is frozen in time. Professors Kobayashi and Tanabe noted that social institutions already were changing in Japan and it may be anticipated that changes in cultural values will follow.

Finally in terms of Japan-America relations Professor Kato noted how economically dependent Japan had become on the rest of the world. Japan and America especially are economically and financially enmeshed.

But both Japanese and Americans need to listen to each other more carefully and to reflect on one's own behavior. Americans are said to be the most self-critical people in the world. One of the virtues instilled in the Japanese child was said to be *hansei*--the ability to reflect upon one's shortcomings. Modern communication systems and travel facilities provide ample opportunity to observe, listen, and learn from others.

Finally, while reflecting on the insights provided by the conference, it is important to keep in mind that "the Japanese" does not exist. Close association makes obvious that Japanese, though trained to work together harmoniously, which to the outsider makes them appear homogeneous, are different from each other in personality, ideas and attitudes. Without such diversity there would be no super-achievers. With such diversity democracy in Japan remains strong, and moreover the people have demonstrated in the past an amazing capability to discard outmoded values and to adjust to new international circumstances.

Robert K. Sakai

I. JAPANESE SOCIAL STRUCTURE: ACHIEVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION

Hidetoshi Kato, National Institute of Multimedia Education

I. Achieving Society

In contrast to commonly held assumptions, Japanese society has been a society where individual achievements were highly esteemed and evaluated. For example, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, a 16th century hero who finally succeeded in unifying the island country, was born and raised in an unknown poor peasant family. According to popular legend, in his childhood, at the age of ten or fifteen, he was sleeping on a bridge and was picked up by Oda Nobunaga, a local feudal lord. After a brief conversation, Oda took him to his castle and appointed him *zoritori*, a modern day counterpart of a shoeshine boy. To make a long success story short, through his wisdom and effort, Hideyoshi was promoted in status gradually, and in a matter of 30 years, he achieved the position of the highest ruler of the nation.

Indeed, in Japan today, especially in the Osaka area where after his great success he built a gigantic castle, he is frequently referred to fondly as "Taiko-san." By extension, those who have similarly made a fortune from meager beginnings are called *Ima Taiko*, or contemporary *Taiko*. Today, *Ima Taiko* are numerous in Japanese society.

All of you I am sure recognize the name Panasonic. This is an extraordinary multinational electronics giant. I would like to emphasize here that this big company did not exist until the 1950s. The founder of the company, the late Mr. Matsushita, was a person who came from a rural village in Wakayama. He started his career as a junior clerk in a small store in Osaka. He then decided to become independent and began manufacturing electric outlet parts. As a result of his inventiveness and energetic marketing, he expanded his business into this huge economic giant.

Let me give you another example. Again, in business, Honda is, needless to say, an automobile manufacturer which is also now established in the global market. I would like to remind you that Honda also did not

exist before 1950 at which time Mr. Soichiro Honda made his first motorcycle. Before that, Mr. Honda ran a small bicycle shop in Hamamatsu in 1945 until the city was burned down in an American air-raid. Overcoming despair, he found usable bicycle parts in the ashes and assembled bicycles which were in high demand. One after another his hand-made bicycles were sold, and with the money he earned he started his bicycle factory. When the Japanese economy came to the point when small engines could be manufactured, he decided to go into the motorcycle business. Being an engineer, Mr. Honda developed an engine of improved efficiency and design, and, in the face of the dominant automobile manufacturers such as Toyota and Nissan, he burst into the automobile market. The media at that time was very skeptical about this venture and predicted that Honda would not be able to compete with the automobile giants. As a matter of fact, some of the Honda company executives said that Honda should stay number one in the motorcycle field and not stray into the automobile industry. Honda, however, resolutely decided to go ahead. The result was success, as we can readily observe. Not only in Japan, but also anywhere in the world, you will find little Hondas. In the past few years, the "little Honda" was supplemented with a "big Honda." Symbolically, the new "big Honda" is on the market being sold under the name of "Legend."

These are only a few examples of success stories in contemporary Japan, and I can illustrate dozens of similar cases. The point I would like to make here is simply that Japanese society has been very mobile in its structure. Regardless of family background, social "connections," and other prescribed conditions, a person can climb up the "social ladder." In other words, Japanese society can be characterized by the ups and downs of individual fortune. In this respect, I believe that both the United States and Japan share the same tradition of individual success (and failure). Japan, then, is an "achieving society" which was theoretically and historically defined by George McLeland.

II. Education

In order to be a "success," or a person who can climb up the Japanese ladder, the most important factor is "education." That has been one of the core values in Japanese cultural history. You are familiar with the "examination hell," i.e. high competitiveness among Japanese young people to gain admission to "name schools" beginning at the elementary school level and continuing through to the university level. People say that the situation is rather pathological, and I do not hesitate to agree with those observations. Indeed, many Japanese children today are so busy not

only with their school work but also with attending *juku*, private institutions which give supplementary lessons. For those high school students who are aiming for good universities, *yobiko* are very popular. They provide the know-how for taking university entrance examinations. The people who fail entrance examinations may continue to attend a *yobiko*. Ironically, one of the most successful *yobiko* finally applied to the Ministry of Education to be approved as a new university. Japan today is, to be frank, an "education crazy" nation.

This orientation has a long history. In the first place, under the influence of China where government officials were selected by strict examinations to test their knowledge of the classics (the system was known as *kakyo*), Japan also adopted tests based on memory. Children are made to memorize facts; for instance, the exact year when Buddhism was first brought to Japan. Personally, I feel it is silly and tragic to impose this style of learning on Japanese children. The *kakyo*, however, had a positive aspect in the sense that even a common man could be selected and promoted to high ranking offices. And that tradition has continued throughout Japanese modern history. For example, think of those Japanese leaders who finally brought about the Meiji Revolution.

I prefer this term to the more commonly used "Meiji Restoration." I will not go into this historical argument here, but suffice it to say that the major players such as Ito Hirobumi, Okubo Toshimichi, and many others were young men who came from lower class samurai backgrounds. If the feudal social system had continued, their lives would have been extremely frustrating. In the era of political ferment, they saw their chance to act as reformers. They were intelligent people who endeavored to reorganize the whole Japanese nation and finally succeeded in taking top government offices after the revolution. Indeed, without their vigorous activities, the modernization and industrialization of Japan would have been impossible. They were not, to be frank, intellectuals, but they had the insight to know that well-educated "human resources" were a vital and decisive element for efficient and quick modernization.

They recruited promising young people from every corner of Japan. At the same time, these leaders felt it necessary to have top class foreign scholars and engineers to educate and train these young Japanese. Thus, altogether three thousand foreign experts were invited at the expense of the government. They were on temporary hire, but the government offered extremely attractive monetary incentives. As a matter of fact, some of those temporary hired foreigners known as *oyatoi-gaijin* were paid higher salaries than the Prime Minister. The foreign experts taught subjects

from archaeology to electrical engineering and from philosophy to railway construction. Students took the strict government examinations to enter institutions of higher education. The sons of the lower class samurai, merchants, and farmers who were ambitious and confident came to Tokyo to take the examination. Once a person passed the examination, his future was certain. Upon completion of their work at the newly established Tokyo Imperial University, many of them were sent to Europe and the United States to receive further training.

The educational policy of the Meiji government was successful, generally speaking. Though the national budget invested in education from the elementary to university level was tremendous, the outcome was surprising. In concrete terms, the Meiji government encouraged the production of competitive products domestically rather than importing products from abroad. As a matter of fact, as early as the 1890s, Japanese exports exceeded imports. Though such terms as "human resources" or "manpower" were not known at the time, the policy choice of giving priority to education seems to have been the best.

Social trends also contributed to the goals of educational policies. At this point, I should mention the name of Fukuzawa Yukichi, a great man of enlightenment and an educator of the Meiji period. He also came from a lower class samurai background and studied medicine in Osaka. He had excellent linguistic abilities and so was chosen as a secretary-translator to accompany the first Japanese diplomatic mission to the United States in late 1850. Even before, but also throughout the Meiji Revolution, he devoted himself to education. As a matter of fact, during the crossfire between the *Kangun* (imperial army) and the *Bakugun* (Tokugawa army), he continued teaching his lessons even while his small private school enrollment dwindled in response to the sound of gun battles. He told his students calmly that the domestic war was going to come to an end and that learning will be the most important factor which will determine the future of Japan. He did not accept any government appointment but wrote a famous book entitled *Gakumon no Susume* (Encouragement of Learning) which is recorded as the first best-selling book in modern Japan. Millions of young people read the book.

At the beginning of this renowned book, Fukuzawa wrote as follows: "It is said that heaven does not create one man above or below another man. This means that when men are born from heaven they all are equal. There is no distinction between high and low. ... For the pursuit of learning it is necessary that each person knows his capacity. They are born free and unrestricted and become free adult men and

women."

These lines were fresh, attractive, and, above all, encouraging for Japanese youth who were looking forward to establishing a new nation. Millions of men and women, old and young, were said to have read this book and were stirred by it. They were assured that "learning" was the basis of achievement both for the nation and each individual. The young men who came to Tokyo to take the entrance examination at Tokyo Imperial University in the 1960s, I am quite confident, were also to some degree under the influence of Fukuzawa's book.

It is important and interesting here to remind ourselves that, on the issue of education, both public policy makers and private advocates were fundamentally in agreement. Fukuzawa, being a radical democrat, was often critical of government authoritarianism and bureaucracy, but he respected learned people. As a matter of fact, in order to produce gifted young men, he founded the first private university in Japan. As many of you know, the school he established was Keio University; the equalitarian/democratic tradition he initiated is still in existence. For example, in this particular university, the campus-mates, faculty, and students alike address each other by "kun" and consciously avoid such honorifics as Dr. or Professor.

The emphasis on education is such a socio-cultural tradition that every parent wants to have his children attend a good school and have a good job in the future. It has been my observation that Japanese parents do not hesitate to invest huge amounts of money for their children's education. Japanese people, especially business people, these days are perceived as big spenders. It is true that we Japanese today spend and invest incredible sums of money both in domestic and international markets, but that is only one side of the "spender" trait. On the other side, you will discover another area of spending, i.e. education.

I am not defending or even claiming that the zeal for education in Japan is a virtue. As discussed already, the issues of education in Japan have many pathological aspects and social problems. However, what I wanted to stress here was the fact that Japanese people perceive "education" as the top priority social value and believe that education is the means by which a person can climb up the social ladder.

III. Contemporary Japanese

So far, I have discussed Japan as an "achievement-oriented" society backed up by an equalitarian philosophy and by a strong belief in education. My next task will be to interpret, if not explain, Japanese behavior as of 1989.

In the first place, many of you must be, more or less, concerned with the problems of trade friction between the two countries. I do not want to excuse myself by saying that I have nothing to do with government policy. Instead, I would like to make a few comments on this issue. To begin with, let me interpret the flood of Japanese manufactured goods flowing into American markets. As far as I know, many Americans are now buying Japanese-made automobiles and electrical appliances, especially VTRs. 100% of the facsimile terminals, not only in the U.S., but also throughout the world, are made in Japan. Why is it that Japan became so strong in industrial products, especially hi-tech-related consumer goods? The answer could be two-fold. As all of you are well aware, after the unconditional surrender of Japan at the conclusion of World War II in 1945, Japan adopted her new constitution which declared total disarmament. We maintain a minimum self-defense force capacity, but our parliament stipulates that the military budget should not exceed 1% of GNP. This ratio is surprisingly low in comparison with other major industrialized countries. The relatively low budget appropriation for the military means that the Japanese economy has to look for consumer markets. One electronics engineer whom I met a few years ago in Tokyo jokingly said that, if he were an American engineer, he would have had hundreds of invitations from military-related industries and institutions including NASA. He was a PhD from a top-ranking engineering school, and his job assignment was to develop a computer-controlled automatic camera. To add to this, I would like some of you who are interested in the development of Japanese engineering to read Chapter 21 of *A Social History of Engineering* by W.H.Armytage (London, 1961) in which the author points out that the largest polytechnic in the world in 1872 was in Japan. The Meiji government put extraordinary emphasis on education, as I have already mentioned; but compared with other disciplines, Japanese educators and administrators have been especially enthusiastic about cultivating engineers. It is no wonder that many innovative ideas and inventions came from Japan and, under the new constitution, highly talented young engineers literally poured into companies producing such consumer goods as Sony, Honda, and Panasonic, to mention a few. I can understand the frustration and hostility among the American public today, but I would like you to understand that Japan has invested greatly in developing the human resources to make Japanese engineering a state-of-the-art field. Facsimilie machines were developed partially as a natural means of electronic communication, but also because our language cannot be transferred by telex.

Another trade issue is that of food. Personally, as a private citizen, I am totally against Japanese protectionism of rice and beef. As a consumer, I prefer less expensive imports. However, I caution that Americans not be too optimistic about liberalization of Japanese import regulations in the future. Rice from Thailand and beef from Australia are going to be much cheaper than American agricultural products. We behave as you do. We lean towards less expensive imports.

I know that you have many questions vis-a-vis Japanese behavior today and its "roots," so I would like to invite your questions and comments. Thank you.

RESPONDENT: Takie Lebra, University of Hawaii

I am very happy to be invited to this session and to serve as discussant for our esteemed guest Professor Kato. The subject matter is interesting in itself and also touches upon my current research topic which is the Japanese hereditary nobility. I have no disagreement with Professor Kato's comments on Japanese achievement orientation, striving for success, the social structure which allows for mobility on the part of those who are success-oriented, and also on the emphasis on education as a means for achieving success. All these seem to be very self-evident and indisputable. As an anthropologist I would like to take issue, however, with his comments regarding the similarity between Japanese and Americans in terms of achievement orientation. I feel that, in order to get at the "roots" of Japanese behavior, we have to look at the less obvious. What I would like to discuss may strike you as unfamiliar, but perhaps it is necessary to go beyond what can be seen on the surface.

To begin, the achievement orientation is definitely an aspect of Japanese culture. In contrast, another part is the idea that success is based on something unachievable, something beyond the influence of education, effort and ability. The reason I bring this up is that when I talk with Japanese in the course of my research, this comes up again and again, i.e. that "blood" runs in a person. "Blood" is ultimately indisputable. It cannot be seen, but they say you can tell from one's breeding what kind of family they are from. It shows up in the way they behave and in one's lowly or noble appearance.

People might refer to a person by saying his parents were so-and-so and his ancestors were so-and-so. This manner of reference still exists, although of course the hereditary nobility has ceased to exist. Still,

however, the distinguished names which have a prominent ancestry are marketable commodities. If you were born with such a name, you would be sought after with marriage proposals from very rich people, or you may be invited to become a figurehead executive for a business concern.

The *iemoto* system in the schools of traditional arts such as flower arrangement, tea ceremony, dance, etc. are based upon the idea that the founder of the school has invented something unique to this school and it has to be perpetuated from generation to generation. So the founding ancestor is deified in what you might call an ancestor cult. The cult of ancestors still exists and exerts an influence upon the Japanese way of thinking. It cannot really be wiped out. You could also say that the ancestor cult underlies the Japanese emperor system.

The idea of karmic chain is related to the ancestor cult. This notion is that destiny is beyond one's control, beyond effort, and binds one to a certain predestination. This idea is again and again used to explain why one did not make it. So the value of heredity, blood, ancestry, and descent lingers on.

The ancestor cult is the basis for the Japanese sense of being Japanese. Even though one may be achievement oriented, to really succeed in Japanese society you have to be Japanese. Of course, being Japanese has nothing to do with achievement; but, in such a closed system, non-Japanese aliens in Japan have very little chance of making it in the society.

I would also like to point out that not only does a person have to be Japanese, one has to be a Japanese man. Of course, again, gender has intrinsically little to do with achievement, but still, Japanese women in Japan are excluded from the upper stratum of occupations and careers.

Professor Kato also stressed the individualistic aspect of success. But is it really individualistic? When the Japanese really succeed in an endeavor, I wonder if it is not true that there are a number of people behind the scenes as support staff, sponsors or collaborators. (A child's educational drive is often inseparable from his/her parent's drive, as is well known from the *kyoiku mama* syndrome.) Success stories tend to be accompanied by a long list of those people to whom the success achiever is indebted. Usually the autobiographies of successful businessmen are filled with names of those to whom acknowledgments of gratitude and indebtedness are addressed. They say that behind every success there is a group of people who provided support. Those people may feel a kind of vicarious satisfaction from the success to which they contributed. So, success may not be quite the individualistic kind of success you might

find in American society; but there is group support for it, and the beneficiary may try hard to succeed, not so much for his own satisfaction, but as a matter of obligation to his benefactors. Both means and goals seem far from being "individualistic."

Turning to education, Japanese education has become an object of envy among American educators, and I tend to agree with them. As Professor Kato himself emphasized, however, the whole educational system is geared toward tests and examinations which are given from stage to stage, even within the span of one year. These many tests serve to screen students from one stage to the next. At a certain point in one's school career, students come to realize that they are not going to make it. Their success or failure becomes socially structured. It is not an individual decision, but, rather through the testing process, they gradually see where they stand and their possibilities for achievement. Indeed, there are many people who never make it. There are the Hondas and Matsushitas, of course, but these are the exceptions.

Whether it is in one's school career, in the examinations, or one's entire occupational career, there is still the belief in success. It is surprising how low the rate of drug addiction is in Japan (compared with the U.S. for example), given this high pressure drive to succeed and the wide discrepancy between the actual failure and the success myth. In both countries you have a success myth, but because everyone does not succeed, there is always failure which produces frustration. Perhaps the low rate of drug addiction may be related to the belief in unachievable, ascribed values.

For those who are successful, the story goes something like this. The peak of your educational career comes when you pass the entrance examinations to a distinguished school. When you graduate, your diploma becomes your pedigree which you carry with you throughout your life. The school from which you graduated is mentioned in many contexts to establish your credibility. It is the peak achievement of your educational and occupational career. This provides you with a sense of security, a pedigree that marks you as one of the elite.

Those who succeed have it very nice, but what about those who fail to achieve in this system? They can take some consolation in blaming their ancestors, at least. They can interpret their situation as predestined. They might say to themselves "It couldn't have been any other way. This was my fate, my destiny." These explanations are very important cultural devices to keep down the frustration level stimulated by a strong achievement orientation. Perhaps Professor Kato's intention was

to counteract the stereotypic image of Japan as "vertical" or "hierarchical." My point is that the achievement or success-orientation is not necessarily opposite the hierarchy, but rather that striving for success could be intensified by the visible hierarchy.

In conclusion, what Professor Kato discussed is entirely true and I do not mean to contradict him; but I have rather tried to reach another less visible aspect of the roots of Japanese behavior. Thank you.

DISCUSSION & QUESTIONS

WHITE: I would like to introduce a loose social-historical frame for some of the things Professor Kato has said. I think there has also been some change in thinking about the success stories that Americans also have, i.e. the Horatio Algers stories. In Japan, however, there seems to be a generational effect also, and some of the stories that have been cited are perhaps not possible for young people today. At the least, the young people I talk to say it is no longer as easy to be a self-made man as it might have been at certain moments in history, including the moments that produced Matsushita and the others. Some young people complain that the window has closed, that perhaps Japan's meritocracy has become narrower and the route to success is more constrained, especially by the educational system. Even within the educational system, supposedly a system based on achievement and not on social background, there are differences now between the kind of child who will succeed and the child who won't, based on the parents' ability to pay for supplementary kinds of education--*juku*, *yobiko*, etc. Rohlen points out that this has produced an inegalitarian element in the educational system. I wonder if you could comment about changes in the factors you discussed.

KATO: I think you are quite right in putting these names (Matsushita, Honda, etc.) in a historical framework. I agree that younger people today think that the era is over in which it is possible to make a success of oneself in Japanese society. I think it is too early to say that. Other names may still emerge. To supplement Professor Lebra's comment that bloodline is important, it also seems that, as far as the business world is concerned, if a bank discovers a promising young man, they do not hesitate to invest money in him. You can see this among younger people in the U.S. today, especially in the computer software world. You have Microsoft in this country in the 1970s and 1980s, and we have their counterparts in Japan.

KOBAYASHI: I would like to comment about education and national development. In 1957, when Sputnik went up into the air, Americans suddenly felt that their educational system was very inadequate and that the Soviet system was superior. I think the same thing is happening today when we look at Japanese education. Japan's economic success is an example to which Americans are looking for clues to help reinvigorate America. Every system has its problems, though in fact, all major systems of education today are experiencing great difficulties. The Soviet system is in very bad shape as we can see from their discussions about *perestroika* and *glasnost* in education. In Japan also, people are not satisfied with the mass system of education. I would suggest that, if you are looking for successful educational systems, it would be best to not equate a good system with successful economic development. Perhaps we should be looking at Denmark or perhaps Norway. We tend to not be interested in the educational systems of small countries, but only those of the major powers. Any discussion of education as a basis for economic or political success has to be tempered because we do not know the relationship between economic development and the quality of a mass educational system. There seems to be a correlation, but we must be cautious about assigning causality.

KASULIS: All the examples you gave of individuals who were successful accomplished their successes in times of chaos. Hideyoshi's rise was at the end of the Warring States Period. There were not many shoeshine boys who made it in the 250-year Tokugawa period. Ito rose to success in the early Meiji period at a time when the government was taking on a totally different structure and capable people were badly needed. And, of course, after World War II, when Honda, etc. built their companies, it was in the midst of economic chaos. Could it be that once the Japanese system works, that type of individual success becomes less likely? And only when it is breaking down, do we find individuals having this personal kind of success?

KATO: I think you are quite right in pointing out that these figures are the products of revolutionary, chaotic periods. I can understand that young people today see the society as too stable and lacking in opportunities, but history may prove them wrong.

SEIDENSTICKER: I want to ask about education and the meritocracy. A fascinating fact is that Orientals outside the Orient do so much better in education than others. I'm thinking specifically about this country. The proportion of Oriental students in good American universities is far higher than the proportion in the country at large. So this would not have

anything to do specifically with the Japanese educational system or with Japan, but what is it about Japanese, Korean, and Chinese culture that produces this phenomenon?

QUESTION: I would like to know about the extent to which entrepreneurship was common in Japan historically.

KATO: Regarding the first question, I do not really know how to answer that, but just let me say that I have heard that, in many American graduate schools, more than 50% of the top-notch PhDs are from Oriental cultures, inclusive of Japan, Korea, and China. Another interesting observation told to me recently is that in Germany it seems that the really brilliant students in German universities are Americans. I think that was his observation rather than a compliment. Regarding the question about entrepreneurship in Japan, from the 16th century, especially after the 17th century, Japan was essentially a merchant society, in contrast to the popular perception of samurai rule. As a matter of fact, in demographic terms, in the mid-19th century the samurai population was a mere 0.5%. Farmers were the dominant class in terms of sheer numbers, followed by merchants. The commercialization of agricultural products started in the late 17th century. In order to make a commercial transaction it was necessary to be able to read and write, so the literacy rate of the Japanese population in the mid-19th century was approximately 50%, and close to 90% in urban areas. In terms of entrepreneurship, i.e. merchandising and commercialization, Japan was really a merchant society rather than a samurai nation.

II. JAPAN'S RESPONSE TO THE MODERN WORLD

Marius Jansen, Princeton University

The title of this symposium, "Roots of Japanese Behavior," immediately suggests a polarity between Japan and other countries. Would we phrase it that way for many other countries? Does our question immediately suggest more pattern and uniformity than it should? Are we perhaps more comfortable with, more tolerant of, a level of generalization for Japan than we are with other countries -- countries we know better?

To this it can be answered that the Japanese, who know their own tradition, often seem to welcome such contrasts and relish their individuality, sometimes styling it as uniqueness. There is a flood of writing about Japanese national character, as we know, and that itself invites the possibility of speculation about what is at least unusual, and perhaps unique, about Japan.

We can safely begin with the statement that there is an unusually sharp sense of self and of Japan as an ethnic community. This is in part the product of insularity, which has been compounded by pendulum swings between opening and seclusion, and in early modern times by the almost total exclusion of the West in the early modern era between 1640 and 1850.

But even before that there was an awareness of being part of Asia without really being in Asia, of sharing Chinese civilization without being Chinese. And in modern times that has been replaced by an orientation toward the West which has produced one of the world's most modern, westernized states that nevertheless was not really part of the West either. At recent summit conferences the Japanese prime minister has always seemed somehow the odd man out, until Prime Minister Nakasone managed to hit it off with President Reagan and work his way into the middle of the discussion and the picture.

My assignment today is to discuss the turbulent century and a half since the coming of Commodore Perry and to try to see some of the cultural roots of Japan's response to the world that forced itself upon it. Let me suggest three principal periods or stages within that response.

The first, and for me still the most interesting, is the so-called "opening" of the nineteenth century. The predominant notes, I feel, were

those of fear and insecurity, but they soon gave way to determination for equality.

Japan began with a consciousness of being far behind the Western countries that came demanding treaties and trade. Its military technology had not advanced during centuries of peace. Its economy and technology, and its governmental institutions, had not experienced the spur to growth and organization that competition in trade and war had provided in Europe. Without that challenge, unification had not proceeded beyond the sensitive balance of shogunate and feudal domains worked out in the early 1600s.

Japanese institutions had not developed, but Japanese society had. Population growth and urban development brought a good deal of economic centralization. Popular protest spread beyond regional and feudal borders. One recent study goes so far as to say that, in the absence of war, the suppression of popular protest was the most important element in contributing to centralization in Japan.

Whatever the case, although political institutions did not change, Japan was much more nearly a nation state by 1860 than it had been in 1660. The centuries of peace had dulled the military superiority of the *shogun* over his vassals; however the forceful domination of the early shogunal despots had been replaced by bureaucratic caution.

One sees this in the response to Perry. The shogun passed the problem on to his vassals with requests for their ideas, he asked the powerless emperor for his opinion, and he even solicited suggestions from commoners. One enterprising lumber merchant, with an eye on the bottom line, suggested they build a vast wooden palisade to keep the West at bay. That's not the way they had done things in the seventeenth century!

Intelligent leaders, though, knew that the West had developed in ways that Japan had not. Books that were imported through the Dutch trading station at Nagasaki had been collected and translated for over fifty years. Literacy had spread the product of that knowledge widely throughout the elite. And books from China, soon available in Japanese editions, brought the news of the disasters of the Opium War. There was wide knowledge that the world order that had sheltered Japan was coming unstuck, and that made for fear and insecurity.

In a short time Japan found itself saddled with unequal treaties with

all the Western countries, its sovereignty impaired by economic and diplomatic indicators of inferiority. It required the work of a generation to undo this and to qualify for treatment as a modern state able to stand on a basis of equality with the West.

It is the process by which this was done that I personally find most interesting. For what followed was a systematic search for the roots of Western strength. I know of no other case in which an entire elite realized the need for change, in which an entire government set itself the task of working out institutions that could adapt foreign example to native tradition. This meant, in part, trying to define that native tradition, identify its core, and nourish its roots.

There was, first of all, a conscious shift of priority and evaluation. China and Eastern tradition, long at the top in prestige, now took second place to the West, which had proved stronger. And, within the West, countries could also change position; the sense of hierarchy was constant, but the makeup could shift. Holland, for instance, had long seemed a thriving and important state, but closer knowledge of England and France knocked it far down the list.

Secondly, the West, which seemed a cultural unit at a distance, proved to be full of variety. Choice was not only possible but necessary. Okakura Tenshin, returning from Europe in the 1880s, asked, "Where is this West that people talk about? Every country is different." Later, one is sorry to say, he began a book with the astounding statement that "Asia is one," which it certainly is not. But the discovery of variety within the West meant the only possible answer was to study and travel and observe.

The great symbol of this is a learning mission of top government officials--fifty, in fact--led by Prince Iwakura, that toured twelve countries of the West for almost two years between 1871 and 1873. They toured factories, visited public schools, examined government institutions, and listened to Japanese students who were already studying overseas. And they returned to find their jobs waiting for them. That this was possible seems to me extraordinary. What is more, though, their colleagues wanted to do the same thing. Being appointed was a political plum. They promised their colleagues that when they returned, it would be their turn to go. (That promise was not kept. Neither was a promise to come back sooner than they did.)

One has the impression of a generation of leading Japanese eager to see what it was that made the West tick. And even in the countryside recent finds of documents show that the local elite--landowning farmers, leading merchants, etc.--organized innumerable groups to consider foreign policy, study foreign constitutions, and speculate, suggest, and petition for changes in political institutions. It is as though suppression of contact produced a remarkable upsurge of interest.

This was not idle curiosity. The official record of the mission, published soon after its return, weighs the pros and cons of different systems, reflects on differences between East and West, and discusses what might work best in Japan.

At that time the United States was very high on the list. The mission began in America and spent more time there than anywhere else. America too was a developing country, committed to schools and education, and concerned with the practical and not the theoretical. Unlike England, which was preaching free trade, the United States was still protecting its industries. There is a fascinating 1871 memorandum by the later Prince Ito to his colleagues in which he argues the case for treaty revision, so that Japan will be able to set its own tariffs and protect itself. We should import only what we need and tax heavily what we can produce ourselves, he argues; the United States does, and the English did so too on their way up. That is how Britain became the workshop of the world. And a memorandum prepared for the embassy by David Murray of Rutgers pointed out that Japan had the opportunity to become an England; "it requires but the introduction of the modern appliances of commerce and the judicious encouragement of the government," he wrote, "to create out of Japan an equally colossal commercial power."

They hired Murray, and he served for five years as advisor to the Ministry of Education. They also hired the Grant administration's Agricultural Commissioner, Capron, and many others.

I have to repeat that this was not indiscriminate copying. It may have been that for some, and it seemed it to many, but basically it was very discriminating adaptation. The question was always there: How can we build a strong state?

One sees it in education: Kido, one of the Iwakura ambassadors, wrote from San Francisco describing an elementary school he had seen:

"The discipline was admirable...unless we pay a great deal attention to the children, the preservation of order in our country in the future will be impossible...we will not be able to elevate our country's prestige...our people are no different from the Americans and Europeans of today; it is all a matter of education."

And in political ideology, Ito, writing from Germany later, pointed out that Japan had nothing like the Christianity that provided the bedrock of Western morality and civic consciousness; the only available "cornerstone for Japan" was the imperial house. "If there is no cornerstone, politics will fall into the hands of the uncontrollable masses, the government will be powerless, and the country will be ruined."

So the search for change led also to the identification of roots. Discipline, loyalty, for instance. But this extended throughout Japanese culture. The determination to build a modern literature, for instance, meant identifying what was good about "traditional" literature and establishing the canon for the future.

The basic conclusion Japanese formed from this travel and study was more encouraging than discouraging. The technological predominance of the West was relatively recent, and Japan should be able to catch up in thirty or forty years. With determination and effort it should be possible to maintain and restore national sovereignty.

And of course we know that it was. With a generation's effort Japan became strong, though hardly wealthy. It defeated China and Russia, won the respect and admiration of the Western world, attracted students and refugees from China and colonial countries and became the ally of Great Britain. By World War I it had arrived.

As a matter of fact, Japan did so much better in the Russo-Japanese War than Britain had in the Boer War that there was a Japan boom in Edwardian England for a decade or so that has some resemblance to the "learn from Japan" literature in the United States more recently. Edwardian writers admired Japanese patriotism, the lack, as they thought, of factional dispute and disunity, and the vigor of the samurai ethic. All this, long before Ezra Vogel's *Japan as Number One*.

The second major period I would like to discuss is Japan's interwar period. The interwar period revealed that the Edwardian image of Japan was wrong. Japan was not nearly as united as it seemed. The modern

state produced competing elites, and they were no longer united by the memory of weakness. Moreover, the world order to which they had adjusted proved to be a moving target. Empire, so long the fashion, was out of style, although the colonial powers were in no hurry to give theirs up. In Germany, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman, and Tsarist Russia, empires had fallen. In China, empire gave way to disorder that provided temptation for some Japanese, and Japanese policies made the disorder greater. It was much more difficult to define or settle on a model state in such confusing times.

What's worse, Japan itself was undergoing generational change, and agreement on what might serve as model was hard to find. The German models, which had been taken in the 1880s, now seemed less authoritative. Some of the institutions that had made for speed in the 19th century worked to slow further change. The emperor system, useful as a spur and symbol of community, now became an ideology. For some it ruled out the possibility of any outside model state. An older generation, fearful of continued change and budding radicalism that accompanied the strains of industrialization, talked about the national polity. Radical young nationalists had different ideas again. The imperial institution that Ito had seen as "cornerstone" threatened to become a barrier instead. Some, like Shidehara, worked for cooperation with the Western powers in the Washington Conference system, while others, like Konoe, criticized that system as hypocritical and sanctimonious.

Add the economic crisis and depression, and the makings for the 1930s were in place. In particular Japan never learned to deal with Chinese nationalism and radicalism. Arrogant military intervention in Manchuria in 1931 and the long nightmare of the China war that followed in 1937 separated Japan from Great Britain and the United States and led to closer ties with the fascist world of Germany and Italy that seemed to be on the forward edge of social and political change. This led finally to the Pacific War and defeat.

The 19th century Meiji response to the modern world had been purposeful, disciplined, and consistent. Japan's response to the world between the wars was none of those things. Of course those worlds themselves were very different. The Meiji world was structured and hierarchical, while the interwar world was much less so.

This brings me to the post World War II era, which looks much more like the Meiji era. Some Meiji statements, like the Charter Oath, promise of assemblies, took on new meaning in the postwar era. The most divisive element of the prewar elite, the military, lost out altogether, making possible a leaner, cleaner central government. The imperial system too was taken substantially out of play. A considerably more vocal populace, free of police restraints, was able to speculate and criticize. Occupation controls produced a managerial bureaucracy that ran the country. Many of the controls we have complained about we put in place ourselves.

There was also long-range planning involved, and some of that reminds me of the Iwakura ambassadors and their view that Japan could catch up in three or four decades.

The memoirs of a recent foreign minister have this story. Some six months before the surrender, the author, then a young bureaucrat, called one of his seniors. They talked about the future. The war was clearly lost. Japan had tried to do too much; it was like a warrior who had starved himself to buy a coat of armor, only to find he was too weak to fight in it. Japan would surely be forced to disarm completely, they agreed. But that might not be a bad thing. Perhaps, in fact, it would be possible to "succeed in business suits to do what we failed to do in uniform." Six months before the surrender and thinking about mounting a credible challenge to the industrialized West!

The postwar world presented a newly structured international system, and it was not difficult to select a model state. Once again there was a reversal of direction, from military to economic strength, and again, with a distinctively national, or community, thrust. It was possible to appeal to different elements in the Japanese tradition. The samurai goal of power had proved unattainable and, in its place, the merchant world of pre-Perry Japan had other goals and models to offer.

There was renewed study of the West, and especially of technology, in which Japan was badly out of date. An industrial policy, forecast by David Murray's term, "the judicious encouragement of the government," and described by Chalmers Johnson's study of MITI, led the way during years when shortage of resources and of capital required concentration on key targets. And so, figuratively and literally, the dry docks that launched

the battleship *Yamato* turned to the construction of super tankers.

All this took place in a setting in which Japan's war aims were to some extent realized. The end of the empire opened the resources and markets of the world to Japanese manufacturers, and the open trading system of the postwar years made for unparalleled opportunity.

The criticism from the West, and especially the United States, of course, is that early postwar tactics, appropriate to a Japan that was far behind, were maintained far longer than was necessary or justifiable. And that criticism created an image of Japan, now often out of date and inaccurate, against which Japanese resentment builds in turn. It is also true that until yesterday, or perhaps today, the Japanese elite has been reluctant to believe that the goal has been attained. And certainly individual Japanese, living as they do, have difficulty believing that they are really rich. A government that relies on the votes of farmers and small shop-keepers, and the money of industrialists, is also understandably slow to alienate all three. Meanwhile, the drumbeat of outside, and especially American, complaint works to strengthen the consciousness of group and community in Japan; and that, in turn, works to slow the growth of consumer consciousness, which is the only sound basis for liberalization and internationalization.

This history helps us to understand the past, and to some extent the present, but it does not tell us where we go next. And there is no real precedent for the present, in which there are no model states for Japan and in which Japan is a great power which denies it has any power.

What has to come is a diminished consciousness of Japan against the world and a full partnership for a Japan in this extraordinary day. For there is now a world economy, and money zips around the globe; goods are only a little slower, but politics and consciousness lag well behind. We use words that really convey our puzzlement; internationalism--*kokusaika*--globalization, Pacific community.

Japan's response to this world will do more to shape it than anything Japan has done before. One can suggest some possibilities, but it is well to do so with the reminder that predictions about Japan have usually proven wrong. In the 1950s our journals were full of analyses of Japan's apparently incurable economic problems; in the 1960s political instability was supposed to be just around the corner, and into the 1970s

trade balances remained ominously negative.

Will the years immediately ahead feature a mindless piling up of credits and industrial victories, stirring resentment and fear among Japan's trading partners and especially in the United States? Or will Japan continue to open its markets, reduce its dependency on exports, and contribute to development through aid and trade so that it becomes a locomotive of growth throughout the underdeveloped world as it already has in East Asia? One could predict either case. We have large and growing literature arguing the former, but it is also clear that development assistance is growing at a rate that will soon make Japan the world's leading giver of aid.

Will Japan turn to the accumulation of independent military power, in response to long-suppressed nationalist urgings, or integrate itself more closely with the American-led system of alliances? Again, either possibility has its arguments. Despite the constant disavowal of military prowess, Japan is already spending more on defense than any country except the two super powers, and the FSX fighter plane debate undoubtedly served as symbol and spur to greater independence. On the other hand, Prime Minister Nakasone's advocacy of greater military power, phrased in terms of international responsibility and sufficiently acceptable to make possible a crossing of the psychological barrier of restricting military expenditure to 1% of GNP, was done by moving closer to, and not away from, cooperation with the United States.

I personally am an incurable optimist and see the web of interrelationship between the United States and Japan as so complex and compelling as to make extreme shifts in policy on either side extremely unlikely. Moreover, I place great hope in the present student generation on both sides of the Pacific. Every available index, from language enrollment to travel and international experience, argues against an upsurge of narrow nationalism. So our student generation may have the answers one day.

In Japan, as here, students have much less consciousness of political borders. They are unmarked by war or ideology, curious and open minded, sometimes almost to excess! They relate to Tienanmen, to *perestroika*, to South Africa, to gender issues, to the West Bank. If they stayed that way, and as their numbers increase, we may one day regard this

topic as obsolete.

RESPONDENT: Robert Sakai, University of Hawaii

Professor Jansen, in his inimitable and deft style, has touched on several values and behavior patterns as seen through a century and half of the history of Japan. From the virtual isolation of the country, especially from the Western world, to sudden exposure to the military might of imperialistic nations; from enthusiastic adoption of Western ideas in the early Meiji period to the zenophobic nationalism of the military rulers of the thirties and early forties; from total defeat in war to number one status in the world economy--these twists and turns are fascinating to contemplate.

The rallying cry in the mid-nineteenth century was *sonno joi* (Revere the Emperor, expel the barbarians); in the Meiji period it was *fukoku kyohei* (wealthy nation, strong military); and today it is *kokusaika* (internationalize). These are broad slogans giving general direction for the application of popular energy, but they were slightly more specific than American calls such as for the Great Society, the New Frontier, or the less stirring promise for a gentler, kinder nation.

The point is that the Japanese people responded to each of these varied and often contradictory programs. The nation acted in concert, and except for some confusion during the 1920s and the disastrous consequences of the Pacific War, most of the officially proclaimed goals of the state were attained.

How do we account for these successes and misadventures of Japanese history. What are the roots of Japanese behavior? Professor Jansen has mentioned the "sharp sense of self and of Japan as an ethnic community." This to me is one of the main roots of Japanese behavior. Especially when confronted by outsiders, Japanese have a strong sense of identity with each other. But more specifically they have always been members of strong political entities, whether as subjects of feudal domains during the period of the Tokugawa shogunate or as citizens of the modern state. In these contexts the people have been schooled and habituated to social discipline and to be receptive to political direction.

During the same period in which Japan rose to great power status in the Meiji period, China declined from great empire to total collapse by 1911. The difference in the histories of the two countries was that, as Sun Yat-sen often lamented, China was like a pan of loose sand, whereas Japan socially and politically appeared to be rock solid.

Professor Jansen mentions the key role of the elite leadership. Though belonging to diverse groups, they were singularly united in the objective of gaining respect for the nation. Thus they urged their followers to sacrifice for the nation using words not dissimilar from President Kennedy's famous phrase, "Ask not what the country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country."

The concern in Japan for the nation as a political entity contrasts again to the situation in China. For four thousand years China was the center of the Asian world because of her great cultural tradition. Thus in the face of the Western challenge, China endeavored first of all to preserve her cultural heritage. This cultural concern inhibited significant innovation towards modernization and eventually contributed to political collapse. In Japan securing and strengthening the nation superseded the importance of culture, and if necessary the leadership was prepared to abandon the past. Although Japan's political leaders were not above creating and promoting ideology, ideology was designed to serve the political needs of the state; in China the presumption was that the state functioned according to the dictates of the ideology.

Professor Jansen alluded to the sense of hierarchy which Japanese extend to the ranking of nations. This also may be said to be a root of behavior. The consciousness of occupying a status of inferiority in this international scheme has provided a driving force for national improvement over the past century and a half as noted by Jansen. The recent attainment of the status of No. 1, at least in the financial world, has caused some perplexity. What should be their behavior now?

The consciousness of deficiencies in their cultural and technical development, sometimes referred to as the Japanese inferiority complex, should never be confused with any sense of innate inferiority. While quick to note their underdevelopment in certain aspects of their society, the Japanese have shown great faith in their ability to improve through education. By 1850 all samurai, most merchants, and many peasants were

literate and by 1890 Japan perhaps had the highest literacy rate in the world. The Iwakura Mission to study the sources of strength of foreign countries, mentioned by Professor Jansen, even included several young girls of elementary school age in anticipation that Western education would make them superior mothers of a new generation of citizens.

The 1920s were, as noted by Professor Jansen, a time of troubles. The last two of the Meiji elder statesmen passed away in 1922 and 1924. Political party leaders for the first time took control of the government. Economically the country was in a depression. Labor unions and farmer groups no longer were content to make the major sacrifices of their personal interests in the dubious name of national well-being. And in foreign policy, just when Japan's navy had attained a paramount position in East Asian waters, other members of the world community called for naval disarmament. Moreover, American racial hostility against the Japanese expressed in the form of the 1924 Immigration Act provided fuel for those ultra-nationalists who opposed the official policy of international cooperation. Finally, the worldwide depression and the breakdown of the global economic order plunged the people into a sense of isolation, and their insecurity contributed to the rise of radical militarists. In asserting the right of Japan to hegemony in Asia the militarists also intoned the uniqueness of the Japanese polity, denounced the selfishness of individuals, and excoriated those who would taint the Japanese spirit with Western liberalism.

The radical militarists had brought Japan to full circle from Tokugawa isolationism, to Meiji Western orientation, and back to a state of isolation from the West. The defensive psychology of isolation encouraged the exaltation of the state. The counterpart of this behavior can be found in the old slogan, *sonno joi* (revere the emperor and expel the barbarians).

With the trauma of defeat there was born new hope in the twin terms, Peace and Democracy. The chauvinism of the past was trashed and American direction for a reconstructed society was readily accepted. Fifteen years after the war's end Prime Minister Ikeda targeted the doubling of the GNP in ten years. It was accomplished in five. By 1973 Japan was challenging the industrial nations for an important share of the international market. Her success startled the Japanese themselves, but it

was the result of a nation intent on restoring national respectability through dedicated study for the improvement of the quality of their products and the efficiency of production.

Such success has engendered its own problems, the solution to which is seen as *kokusaika*, the need to internationalize. In its narrow sense the term is still nation-centered, a means for defusing outside criticism and preserving Japan's standing in the international community. In its broader sense, the term impacts on a basic root of Japanese behavior. From inward looking devotion to national welfare the term calls for an outward extension of responsibility for the international community. This would give basis for a new sense of pride and there are ample signs that Japan is up for the challenge.

DISCUSSION & QUESTIONS:

QUESTION: I wanted to ask a question to Dr. Jansen and to Dr. Kato regarding the group that went on the 2 year learning expedition in 1871-73. In the present some of the most interesting things are happening in the business sphere between Japan and New York, for instance the Nomura 20% purchase of a preeminent merger and acquisitions boutique. Then there is the Japanese investment house which has a substantial portion of the Blackstone-Peterson group that assisted in the Sony CBS records purchase and also Sony's 3.5 billion all cash purchase of Columbia recently. These events point to a confidence on the part of the preeminent Japanese companies in electronics and in investment banking that they can "reverse engineer" the most sophisticated American businesses, a great confidence that they can not only "pay tuition," to use Akio Morita's phrase, learn something, then turn around, and become creative in making new products out of what they have learned.

In talking about roots of Japanese behavior, can you give us any other historical insight into this ability of the Japanese business to "reverse engineer" businesses, economies, or countries?

JANSEN: Well, in the sense of confidence that one can do as well, even better, with others' technology or thought, historically, in the 18th century, one heard Japanese Confucianists saying that Japan is the true success of Chinese Confucianism. The Christian Uchimura Kanzo argued

that the Japanese could be as good or better Christians than the West, because the West couldn't believe in what it was doing and didn't follow it. Nichiren did the same thing with Buddhism. Perhaps this idea could be extended to the area of technology.

KATO: I would like to make two points. First, in the historical past, we had a similar incident in the 15th century, when the first firearms were brought into Japan. It took only a few years until Japanese started manufacturing very nice firearms in the city of Sakai. Oda Nobunaga already had 3000 firearms made in Japan after the first reception of firearms from the Portuguese. That is another example of conversion, i.e. stimulation from outside resulting in improvements. Second, American journalism and media are so vocal and apprehensive about Japanese investment in the U.S., especially in Hawaii. Many people talk about Japanese real estate brokers' purchase of Manhattan buildings and so forth; but I think we should be reminded that the biggest investor in real estate in New York City is the Netherlands, followed by Germany, and Japan ranks number 3. The Dutch and Germans belongs to the same Western block, so American people do not seem to mind their investment.

QUESTION: The issue here is that Dutch holdings are overwhelmingly shareholdings, and that's a big chunk of it. And the shock about the Japanese is that it's come up so quickly, without precedent.

QUESTION: Professor Jansen, you gave us a concise history of what happened in the past 150 years in Japan and described the so-called roots of Japanese behavior, but I'm wondering if you can somehow establish a relationship between what happened in the past 150 years and what we see today. In Hollywood Sony has purchased Columbia Pictures, and in Honolulu real estate is being purchased. Can you relate what happened in the past to what's happening today, in a more concrete way, so that we can understand how these historical roots have affected the way Japanese are behaving today. In what ways can we see how those things that you mentioned are manifesting themselves, for example, in the way Mr. Morita behaves, in the way Mr. Kawamoto behaves. How does it relate?

JANSEN: One common thread may be this striving to equal and excel, which is certainly there, isn't it?

KASULIS: This goes back to Professor Jansen's original point, but one mistake we can make is to assume that just because the Japanese do

something, they're doing something Japanese. Both of those characteristics, buying real estate in foreign countries and Sony buying out Columbia Pictures, just make good economic sense. Let's start with Sony. Sony got clobbered by Panasonic when they used the Beta format and Panasonic used VHS. They got creamed. Nowadays, you can probably buy a Betamax for fifty bucks, because you have no tapes to play on it. Sony then decided to develop the technology for the small camcorder, using the 8mm videotape. There are no movies available on 8mm videotape. So anybody who gets a small camera can't use the same machine to watch the movies or even rent a movie and watch it. What could be better than to buy one of the largest distributors of movies and then put all these things in 8mm format so that you can develop a market share on 8mm format before they again get clobbered and pushed out by the VHS format. There's nothing Japanese in THAT. I mean that's just smart, right?

About the real estate, the Japanese are rich, and they're not rich. A lot of their money is funny money. The reason for that is that the real estate value of Japan is something like ten times the real estate value of the entire U.S. Which means that the way they are leveraging their entire economy is based on internal land values. Now what would happen if you had an economic disaster and everybody had to liquidate assets. How many Germans are going to go running to buy a one-bedroom, $250,000 apartment in Tokyo? It's not worth it. However, they might buy a one-bedroom, $250,000 condominium in Maui. If your economy is based in an asset base that cannot liquefy, because no one else wants land in Japan except Japanese, and if you can use your leverage money by mortgaging your own land in Japan and get the bank to lend you money and you buy the land someplace else, then you've now got real money and not funny money. If I had money in Japan, and was worried about my family's financial future, I certainly wouldn't invest it in Japanese real estate, because I see all these crazy Westerners going around saying we've got to bash Japan. If that ever happens and we have a trade war, then all of my money is going to be worthless. So I invest abroad, in land.

For the Japanese, there may also be a cultural factor emphasizing the value of land. Land has always been of such high value to the Japanese, so the natural thing for them to think about is buying land

elsewhere. It gives them a sense of great well-being. I mean that's how my Lithuanian grandparents felt about it. They could never own land in their own country. The first thing they did when they came to the U.S. was buy 4 acres of land and they were really happy. So some of this stuff I think is not Japanesey. I think it's just powerful economic forces and common sense at work. Which is not to say that it's in the interest of the West to allow this to happen. That's a totally different point. One of the points is to figure out the motivation of Japanese actions. Are they there to try to grab up the world and to build their own empire? Some of them I think do think that way. Or are they worried about the security of their financial base? If they were more allayed by the assurance that there would be more cooperation between the West and Japan and they didn't have to worry about a trade war, then they wouldn't have to worry about liquefying their assets at the drop of a coin. If we could understand what the motivation is and how many people are being motivated which way, we in the West might be able to address the problem too, in radically different ways. If it's Japanese economic imperialism, we have to act one way; but if it's a Japanese insecurity about the volatility of their whole economic system, we might be able to work out some other way that's more in the mutual interest that would be able to build more stability between our two countries.

III. PHILOSOPHICAL/RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF JAPANESE BEHAVIOR

Thomas Kasulis, Northland College

As a specialist in Japanese philosophy, I study Japanese thinking: its forms of argument; its processes of decision-making; its connection to moral, religious, and political values; its development through history. For several years, I have been working on a book explaining the evolution of these cultural patterns of rationality and value and have written already over 500 pages. I cannot summarize that here in a half hour. Nor do I think I should.

My goal today is not to increase your factual knowledge (what the German social philosophers called *Verstand)* about Japan: A group like this is probably already quite well-versed in things Japanese. Rather, I hope to lead us to an insightful understanding *(Verstehen)* of what it is like to be Japanese. We will actually try to think like a Japanese, if only for a few fleeting moments.

After two decades of studying comparative thought, I have concluded that cultures differ little in their logic or use of reason. The real difference lies, I believe, in what aspect of our humanness they decide to emphasize, enhance, and preserve as central. What is foreground in one culture may be background in another. Hence, by describing a series of images, we should be able to evoke an aspect of our experience that is, on the one hand, an undeniable part of us, but on the other hand, a part of us that our cultural upbringing has taught us to treat as peripheral to understanding ourselves and the world. Yet, this marginalized part of ourselves will be precisely what the Japanese cultural tradition has tended to make central. Using our imagination, therefore, we can then shift our culturally dependent priorities so that we bring into the center what has been peripheral and, in so doing, shift us into a Japanese perspective.

In the current context of popular discussions about understanding the Japanese, I should note that my effort to make us Japanologists--students of Japan--is not a veiled attempt to transform us into Japan apologists--defenders of Japan. To understand the Japanese, indeed to understand the people of any alien culture, requires an act of empathic imagination: We must be willing to put ourselves in the other person's shoes and to see the world from that perspective. That does not imply that

we have to agree with, or even like, the Japanese. The Japanese, as a people and as a nation, are sometimes inconsistent, sometimes greedy, sometimes overly nationalistic, sometimes deceitful, sometimes self-serving, sometimes pigheaded, sometimes grossly insensitive to cultural differences. In those respects, at least, they are just like us. And when the Japanese do wrong, we should not hesitate to criticize them and impose sanctions, just as we do to each other. But we should also know that to persuade and convince them, we need to see things from their perspective as well as ours.

Enough of this theorizing: Let us undertake the task at hand--imagining ourselves into the Japanese context. To follow my presentation, you must first put yourself in the right frame of mind. You must be willing to drop your own cultural assumptions for a little while. Do not think too much about what I have to say; rather, just follow along for the time being. Do not judge whether it is good or bad to think and feel this way and, most importantly, please do not think about whether this is foreign or American, Buddhist or Christian. Just accept it as an aspect of being human. Use your imagination, not your logic, to put yourself into the state of mind I will be characterizing through a series of six images.

Image I--Think of what it is like to be with your spouse or a lifelong dear friend. Such a person is someone to whom you feel you can say anything, but you need say nothing in order to be understood. A little pucker of the lip, a twitch in the eye, a movement of the eyebrow, a barely audible sigh says it all.

Image II--Someone steals your wallet. Both the money and the treasured family pictures--negatives lost long ago--are gone. The money belonged to you; it was your money. But the pictures belonged with *you*, not to you. In taking the photos, the thief stole part of your self, not merely something external like the money over which you held temporary title.

Image III--You see your daughter after she comes home from school. You know something is wrong and something is bothering her. You can't put your finger on it, and you can't explain how you know, but you do know

she will pick at her dinner and look at the television tonight without really watching it. You even know when you ask her what's wrong, she'll say "nothing's wrong."

Image IV--You've been working on a piano piece for months, endlessly drilling the progressions and chords, getting the technique down perfectly. One day, quite unexpectedly, the awareness of technique disappears. You are playing the same notes as always, but it is completely different. You feel you are not playing the music, but rather, the music is playing through you.

Image V--Michelangelo looks at the discarded block of marble given to him. He wonders what to do with it. Studying the marble, the image of David appears from within it and the artist sets to work releasing the image from its stone case.

Image VI--After traveling for some weeks, you return home. You take a little stroll around the yard, go into the house, sit in your favorite chair, and a close friend drops by to ask about your trip. You feel yourself relax as you let down your defenses and give yourself up to the familiar. You feel you are really home.

Now that you used your imagination to capture a certain mood or feeling, let us analyze those imagined and remembered experiences in more detail. What do they all share? In my terminology, I say that they are all permeated with a sense of intimacy. The word "intimacy" may at first strike you oddly. It seems more likely the name of a French perfume or maybe a title for a sex manual rather than a spiritual concept. In an important sense, and perhaps this tells us something about our own cultural priorities, we have robbed the word of some of its original power. So let us think a moment about what it originally meant. In Latin *intimus* means either "what is innermost" or "a close friend." The verb *intimare* means "to make known." Putting this together, we can say that the root meaning of intimacy is something like *making known to a close friend what is innermost*. Thus, intimacy involves an inseparability, a belonging together, a sharing. We have many friends and advisers, but

only a few intimates. Many things are in relation, but only some are *intimately* related. We know many things, but have intimate knowledge of only a few. We express many things, but only those in our inner circle understand what we *intimate*.

With this sense of intimacy clearly in mind, we can now state what I consider to be a basic principle of Japanese spirituality, a value orientation which has driven its culture from ancient times up to the present. *Namely, the Japanese character has been such that it will, whenever possible, act so as to preserve and enhance intimacy.*

As a philosopher, I have tried to research the deeper structures of this phenomenon, attempting to clarify its meaning and implications for a variety of philosophical issues such as the nature of knowledge, religious behavior, language, artistic expression, ethics, and so forth. Here we can suggest at least briefly what some of those deeper structures are.

We will consider five key characteristics of intimacy. First, the objectivity of intimate knowledge is personal, not public. For the past four centuries, the West has tended to divide knowledge neatly into two types: subjective and personal vs. objective and public. That is, we have come to assume any knowledge limited to an individual or a group is not objective, but only the projection of subjective feelings or intuitions. If something is objectively true, the common Western thinking insists it is public in that its grounds are verifiable by any one of us. Intimate knowledge suggests, however, the possibility of objective, non-public knowledge. Despite our Western theories, we do recognize the authority of this form of knowledge in some of our everyday practices, however. Let us consider just one example.

We have probably all had the opportunity to watch the Olympic games on television. In many of the events such as diving and gymnastics, the judges did two types of scoring: one for degree of difficulty and one for style or form. The first score is objective and public--everyone in the stands could observe the dive, verify how many somersaults were involved and determine the degree of difficulty score by reference to a set of rules. If two judges disagreed about the difficulty of the performance, we could even play back a videotape and determine which judge was correct. But what about the score for style or form? No nonexpert can make that judgment, no instant replay could verify the

accuracy of the score. Therefore, the judgment is non-public. Yet, the judgment is not simply subjective--the judges are expected to agree within a small margin of error. It is not like Siskel and Ebert at the movies, where disagreement signals subjective differences in taste. In fact, if the disagreement on scoring the style component is too great, we suspect political motives to be coloring the judgment. That is, we accuse the judges of dishonesty, but there can only be dishonesty in judgment where there is objectivity. Hence, we have a case of objective, but personal knowledge.

In Japan, where the master-apprentice relationship is still strong not only in arts and in spiritual training, but even in management of large corporations, it is important for us to appreciate the nature of this form of intimate knowing. The basis for Japanese decision-making is more often experience than theoretical knowledge. This behavioral attitude underlies three aspects of Japanese organizational structure often noted by the comparative managerial analysts: the comparatively rigid seniority system, the drive for consensus, and the bottom-up input system for product development.

First, the senior member of the firm is respected not because of some venerable East Asian tradition which treasures the elders (senior citizens in general are treated rather shabbily in Japan--older people commonly relinquish their chairs on trains and subways to children, for example). Rather, within a given field of expertise, the assumption is that more experience, not more theoretical education or more intelligence, generates more insight. The flipside of this phenomenon is that if the elder persons are no longer functional in the field of expertise, their value to society is relatively nil. Part of the problem in the treatment of the elderly today is that the replacement of the nuclear family for the multi-generational family has cut off the elders from their field of expertise--the house or the family. So, Japanese society is having difficulty in knowing how to treat them.

Second, if your society venerates harmonious consensus rather than the compromises generated out of the free exchange of conflicting ideas, it is important to have a large base of common, rather than diverse, experience. Students should study the same textbooks and have those lessons taught as similarly as possible. You should also connect people

with common educational backgrounds: graduating from the same university, or entering the corporation in the same year, for example, are critical factors in the social and business structures of Japanese society.

Third, the Japanese version of quality-control circles looks to the experience of the workers on the assembly-line for new ideas in product development and production engineering. The engineers can then build on those ideas, but the experience of the assembly-line directs the theoretical.

The second characteristic of intimacy we will discuss is its emphasis on what philosophers call internal, rather than external, relationship. An external relationship assumes that each part of the relationship exists independently and that the relatents *enter into* relation. If the relationship is dissolved, the relatents remain unchanged and return to their independent selves. Western law, for example, tends to look at marriage in this way. The law is designed to formalize or dissolve the bond relating two independent persons, each with one's own individual rights, privileges, and duties. An internal relationship, on the other hand, is more like the overlapping of two circles. Part of circle A is part of circle B and vice versa. If B were to disappear, A would lose part of itself. An internal relationship is part of what things are, not just a connection they have made. In our society, for example, we often think of love in marriage being more like an internal relationship. In a loving relationship, when there is separation or death, the partner feels he or she has lost part of oneself, not just been disconnected from an external tie.

To understand how Japanese society functions without contracts, we need to remember this difference between external and internal relations. As many people in this room have undoubtedly discovered on their own, to strike a business deal with a Japanese is more like a dating game than a legal arrangement. Just as many of us try to avoid blind dates, the Japanese wants to have a clear internal relationship established before any serious interaction takes place. Whereas we think of the attorney as the agent who forges the link connecting the two legal entities (the attorney protects each relatent's individual rights and formulates the contract as the binding external relation), the Japanese looks for the *omiai*, the go-between in a marriage arrangement. The *omiai* knows the two relatents and understands the web of relationships and personality traits constituting the common ground of internal relatedness. By showing how

the two circles already overlap, the *omiai* is able to strengthen the internal relationships that are already there.

The third characteristic of intimate knowledge is that it has an affective or feeling, as well as intellectual, dimension. Modern Western theories of knowledge make a sharp separation between thought and feeling. If we consider how we know that today is Saturday, that 1 + 1 = 2, or that the grass is green, for example, there is certainly no place for emotion in those judgments. But what about the way we know another person? or the way the craftsperson knows the feel of the tools and the wood? or the way the teacher knows what example will help the student most? In such cases, feelings, intuitions, gut reactions, and hunches are important. The modern Western theories of science and fact tend to consider knowledge a black-and-white affair: To know is to be able to prove empirically and logically. Yet, by such criteria, I could never claim to "know" my children, for example. But certainly, I *do* know them in some respects and know them in more than a simple factual way. I empathize with them; I can readily imagine what they feel and what they will do in a way that an objective, external, intellectual knowledge would never enable me to do so.

For a society like Japan that emphasizes the sensing of a consensus, the leaving unsaid of what is most important, and the learning by imitation of the master, the affectively charged forms of knowing must be included in our analysis. In a Japanese conversation, to know the other person's meaning is not to understand the words being said, but to feel what is not being said. We use words to point to what we mean, but the Japanese tendency is to use words to frame what they mean. The Christian God is all-knowing and is identified in the Gospel of John with the Word or expression (*logos*); the Buddhist ideal is the wisdom that is based not in words, but in nothingness~ emptiness (*mu*). If the Japanese view seems exotic and irrational, recall the feeling you felt in Image I about being with a spouse or a lifelong dear friend. "Such a person is someone to whom you can say anything, but you need say nothing in order to be understood." And in our previously mentioned example of learning the business by modeling yourself after the elder master, the knowledge comes not by discourse, but by imitation. Understanding is expressed not in explanation, but in silent mimicry.

This later comment leads directly to our fourth characteristic of intimacy: Intimacy has a bodily or somatic aspect to complement the mental or psychological. Since, as we just noted, intimacy has a feeling component, it follows that the body must be involved. It is hard to imagine a disembodied affect or feeling. We could not have a "gut feeling" if we had no guts. Furthermore, if we think about how the gymnastics judges acquired their intimate knowledge of the sport, we would have to say they learned it through their *praxis*, the psychophysical enactment of the training, performing, coaching, and judging. They incorporated their knowledge, they literally brought it into their bodies, through repeatedly practicing the forms (what the Japanese call *kata)* of gymnastics activities, initially under the guidance of a master until they themselves became masters. In a similar way, one learns Japanese management or politics by enacting the forms of the behavior. It is not a matter of simply building an intellectual knowledge base of useful information. We may note how unlike a computer is this practical wisdom. A computer needs no master to mimic, needs no exercises to repeat, needs no habits to form. It is pure intellectuality. As such it is also impersonal.

We may also note in this regard the importance of physical style to personhood. How do we come to know another person initially? Contrary to the idiom, there is no meeting of the minds. We meet not minds but people--flesh and blood, thinking and feeling human beings. We meet an *incarnate* person, even if that person is only perceivable as a voice on the phone or a style of writing. We come to know people through the way they walk, talk, dress, or smile. Style is the intimation of what we are. Getting to know someone is getting to the point where we can read those intimations.

In a country like Japan where tea ceremony or Noh drama is stylized into a sequence of soft gestures suggestive of profundity, where Zen Buddhist enlightenment is enacted through the meditative activities of the monastery, where young managers learn the ropes by doing rather than through theoretical education, and where differentiation in bowing behavior intimates a complex structure of respect, deference, and duty, the somatic aspect of understanding must be considered alongside the intellectual.

In fact, the difference between the body-language of the handshake

and the bow deserves a bit more reflection. The handshake is egalitarian and democratic: Its performance is virtually the same irrespective of the participant's relative status. The bow, on the other hand, is almost always influenced by deference and respect. The handshake preserves each person's integrity and, as such, can even signal an agreement as well as be a gesture of greeting or parting. It symbolizes the two people's coming into an external relation that preserves their separateness and protects their individual rights. The bow, on the other hand, signals the nature of the internal relationship that connects the two people. One person shows respect for the other and the other person shows responsibility for the person showing the respect. This is why, incidentally, we can sometimes observe two Japanese jockeying for the lower status in their exchange of bows. Sometimes it is better to be the recipient of another's sense of responsibility than it is to be respected.

Finally, the fifth characteristic of intimate knowledge is that its ground is not generally self-conscious, reflective, or self-illuminating. Again, this runs counter to many modern Western philosophical tendencies. We have come to think of self-consciousness as illumination, as enlightenment. Self-consciousness brings insight into ourselves, our values, our behavior. We submit our actions to the illumination of self-criticism in light of principles, ethical codes, and commandments. We trust in the process of bringing our assumptions to light and testing them in a detached manner.

Yet, if we go back to our previous Image III about the parent's knowing a child is troubled, what explicit, self-conscious grounds does the parent have for making that judgment? Sometimes we want to say we don't know exactly how we know something about someone, but we *just know*. How do we know how to ride a bicycle? How do we know a toddler is about to fall? How do we know when to press a friend on a certain point and when to back off? If we cannot be clearly self-conscious of the process that grounds that knowledge, we cannot simply assume it is inferior to the knowledge of, say, what time it is. Perhaps there are different kinds of knowledge as well as different degrees of knowledge. That practical wisdom that comes from years of exposure to a person or to a particular process cannot be explicitly laid out in terms of principles and data.

If we want to learn about Zen Buddhism or Japanese management, we must realize that the knowledge they exemplify does not come through the application of dogmas or principles. They derive rather from the unself-conscious assimilation of a way of living and acting. It is like the knowledge of the football running back who "just knows" when to deviate from the set play and run in the opposite direction. That knowledge comes not from studying diagrams in play books, but from running the plays over and over again in practice. In the post-game interview, the star seldom says anything illuminating at all about how or why he did what he did. He just did it. This is not a sign of the lack of intelligence, but rather, a sign of the kind of knowledge it is. The football player learned his knowledge by consciously training his body to react, not by intellectually mastering a set of facts. Hence, he cannot talk about what he knows.

This concludes our basic analysis of intimacy, its philosophical character and its manifestations in Japanese behavior. In the final section of this paper, let us turn to the religious dimension of Japanese life, giving some suggestion as to how it exemplifies, enhances, and preserves the focus on intimacy.

The two major religions of Japan are Shinto and Buddhism. According to the 1986 statistics of the Japan Agency for Cultural Affairs, Japan has a population of 120 million people, of which 93% are Shinto and 74% Buddhist. Obviously, a very large majority of Japanese find no paradox in defining themselves as both Shinto and Buddhist. This fact itself reveals something basic about Shinto.

Shinto is the offshoot of the indigenous religion in Japan, the manaistic, animistic, magical religion that existed before the impact of Chinese high culture and of which we find traces in archaeological artifacts, ancient myths, and early poetic works. Shinto is an ethnic rather than universal religion so it does not proselytize or seek converts. It is as tied to the Japanese sense of ethnicity as Judaism is to Jews and Hinduism to Indians. Being Shinto means to many Japanese nothing more or less than being Japanese. Hence, 93% of the population can in some way identify with it.

One key aspect of Shinto religious behavior is that it is remarkably nondoctrinal. It is more a set of customs, rituals, and feelings than a system of beliefs. Second, Shinto is often directly tied to the natural

phenomena of the Japanese landscape. The Shinto word for sacred presence is *kami* and it can be applied not only to the gods or to the emperor, but more commonly to almost anything deserving our awe: a natural phenomenon such as a sacred tree, waterfall, or Mount Fuji; the ghost of a great warrior or teacher; even a special sword. Hence, Shinto shrines often demarcate a sacred space, not a space made sacred by some historical event (like Mt. Sinai or Bethlehem or Mecca), but a place that is sacred just because of its ability to instill a sense of power and wonder. Third, and this aspect of Shinto is perhaps best-known to Westerners, Shinto is an expression of ethnocentricity. Precisely because Shinto is more behavioral than doctrinal, it lends itself to political manipulation. Since Shinto functions on the intimate level, it is more emotional than rational, more felt and embodied in actions than reflectively analyzed. In an important sense, therefore, one cannot argue about what Shinto really means. Therefore, if one can successfully manipulate the symbol system so that it becomes attached to a particular political ideology, it becomes impossible to reject that ideology without rejecting one's own Japaneseness.

Throughout Japanese history, cunning politicians have manipulated the Shinto value system to serve their own ends. Two historical examples are particularly striking. The first was in the eighth century in the recording of the official court histories, the *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki*. These works included a mythological history to subordinate all the competing *kami* under the sun goddess, *Amaterasu*, and in turn, to link *Amaterasu* to the imperial family. The gods of the rival clans were placed into a hierarchy roughly reflecting the political hierarchy of the clans at the time. This political move linking every *kami* in Japan to a single system headed by the *kami* of the imperial family helped to unite the country into a central government with à theocratic justification. The other example is one closer to us in time: the way the Japanese nationalists and militarists used the symbolic function of the emperor to justify a claim to Japanese uniqueness, invulnerability, and ethnic destiny. This nineteenth- and twentieth-century development had its intellectual roots in the rise of the Native Studies (*Kokugaku*) movement at the close of the eighteenth century. This intellectual movement reactivated the ancient Shinto link between Japanese spiritual and political identity.

The point for us to note is that Shinto in itself is a simple, rather

innocuous form of folk religious piety. It stresses the characteristics of intimacy so strongly, however, that is remains susceptible to political manipulation and distortion. It is so encapsulated within an intimate context that it is difficult to argue for it, against it, or even within it. To argue shows only that one does not intimately understand, that one is an outsider. Perhaps it is most analogous to our American idea of family. We theorize little about families: we just have them and live within them. Yet, a cunning politician can use the family as a political symbol around which to rally votes and can do so without saying anything substantive about families at all. And to resist a politician who has successfully identified a political platform with "family values" seems somehow "un-American." Hence, Ronald Reagan could successfully identify himself with the family even though he was divorced, alienated from his son, and hadn't even ever seen his eighteen-month old grandchild. Trying to explain the link between Shinto and politics in Japan is probably not more difficult than explaining the link between family and politics in our contemporary American context.

The simple intimacy at the core of Shinto is obvious when we investigate its most common practice, the visit to the local shrine. Millions of times every day, Japanese stop for a moment at a neighborhood shrine. Typically, the ritual is something like this: the person washes one's hand and mouth in a water trough, goes up to the shrine, rings a gong or claps one's hands, stands there silently with hands in a prayerful gesture, claps again, and leaves. The interesting aspect of this phenomenon is revealed only on closer examination and interview. What does the shrine contain? Often nothing at all or only a simple mirror. What does the Japanese say in that moment of silence? Typically nothing. Often the person does not even know the name of the *kami* to whom the shrine is dedicated. Why does the person go there: for petition? for thanksgiving? for purification? As often as not, the Japanese subject is unable to say. The person simply stops, feels the presence of the *kami* and goes on with the day's business.

What, then, is this most common of Shinto rituals all about? It is simply a recognition of, and formal participation in, the presence of *kami*. For that brief moment of silence, the Japanese opens oneself to that presence and becomes intimate with it. To ask why one visits the shrine

is an odd question. It is as if we asked people why they visit their intimate friends. Is it to thank them for something, to ask for something, to get something off their chest? These may well be part of the purpose of the visit, but just as likely the visit stems form the urge to share a moment together. "I was in the neighborhood and just felt like dropping by for a little while." In that moment in front of the shrine, the Japanese is making a physically embodied intimation, an affirmation of the intimate circles to which he or she belongs: the natural world, the sacred space, the *kami*, one's fellow Japanese.

Let us turn now to the discussion of the other important religious tradition to affect Japanese behavior: Buddhism. For the sake of brevity, let us consider just the two most popular traditions: Pure Land Buddhism and Zen. And let us consider them in terms only of their most popular forms, Shin Buddhism founded by Shinran and the Soto Zen Buddhism founded by Dogen, both in the thirteenth century.

Pure Land Buddhism maintains that any conscious attempt to perform a religious practice is itself a way of separating oneself from the reality of Buddha. As human beings we suffer because we act against our true natures and break off our intimacy with the world, with each other, and the ground of spiritual reality. The only way to re-establish that intimacy is by completely relinquishing even the slightest sense of self. One must surrender completely to the grace of Amida Buddha, one of the devotional, heavenly forms of the Buddha known only through spiritual vision. If one can do so, one will be assured rebirth in Amida's Pure Land, a heavenly state wherein the circumstances, unlike those of this world, are favorable for spiritual development and the achievement of enlightenment. Even this act of faith is itself understood to be only a manifestation of the Buddha's activity. If this faith occurs, however, the person is transformed and becomes part of the natural, spontaneous expression of the Buddha-principle.

In founding the Shin tradition of Pure Land Buddhism, Shinran (1173-1263) personalized the Pure Land message even further, making the Pure Land not simply an other-worldly heaven to which one goes after death, but rather, the infusion in this world of a sacred power into the individual. Yet, according to Shinran, we are so permeated with a sense of ego and sin that the pure trusting faith in Amida necessary to this rebirth

is always just at the horizon of possibility. It is as if it is always there just beyond our grasp, but to reach for it only pushes it further away. We must thoroughly recognize our own inadequacy and only through a pure act of self-surrender to Amida's saving grace can we ever attain that which is always just beyond us.

To see what is at stake in this Shin Buddhist perspective, it is useful to contrast it with Zen Buddhism, particularly the Soto tradition established by Dogen at about the same time. Unlike the Shin Buddhist tradition which understands intimacy as being established only by surrendering the self to the power of Amida realized through faith, Zen insists on the straightforward acceptance of reality as it really is, that is, reality as it presents itself to us directly when we do not try to conceptualize it or order it according to our expectations or desires. Through disciplined meditation, one is supposed to quiet the thinking functions that tend to arrange our experience into what we want to see, hear, taste, smell, and feel. If we can successfully do this, we can directly experience what-is as-it-is.

The contrast between Shin and Zen Buddhism amounts to a radical divergence in understanding how self-fulfillment is possible. For Shin Buddhism, we realize the self by relinquishing it to the power of another *(tariki)*. For Zen we realize the self by losing it in our self-imposed discipline. In Shin, Amida Buddha saves us; in Zen, we save ourselves *(jiriki)*. Dogen (1200-1253), in fact, made the contrast even more striking by claiming that in Zen meditation we are already enlightened. Diverging from the other Zen traditions in Japan, Dogen claimed meditation is not a means to enlightenment, but the expression of enlightenment itself. To sit in meditation is to be enlightened.

In their understandings of self-fulfillment, Shinran and Dogen agree that the way to self-fulfillment is through losing the self as center. For Shinran, self-fulfillment is realized through trust and dependence on a power beyond the self. We must recognize our individual limitations and personal corruption. This value orientation has had a lasting effect on the self-effacing, working-in-the-service-of-others psychology so marked in the Japanese. For Dogen, on the other hand, we lose the self by giving it over to self-discipline. We lose the self by concentrating in what we are doing. This leads to the psychology of quality control: you do your job

right, not because it will have utilitarian benefits, but because the concentration and discipline needed to do the job right is a spiritual end in itself. It is not the perfection of the product that is important. Importance lies in the perfection of the person's concentration and discipline which, it turns out, makes the product perfect. In this light, early morning calisthenics at the factory makes sense.

If there is a universal character to religious thought, it is that good religious ideas will get distorted into hypocritical actions. The behavioral distortion of Shinran's message is that the individual can do nothing; no individual can make a difference. The very act of trying to make a difference involves the ego and necessarily pollutes the action. As the Japanese so often say: *"shikata ga nai"*- "there is no alternative." They will say this even in contexts where the Westerner culturally trained in the ideal of autonomy can envision dozens of alternatives. Another hypocritical distortion of the Shin Buddhist ideal is when the over-indulgence in *amae*, entrusting oneself to the loving care of another person, reaches pathological proportions, when the ideal of interdependence degenerates into a complete dependence on the other.

What, then, is the hypocritical distortion of Dogen's Zen principle of discipline as an end in itself? In Japan, how something is done can so dominate the evaluation of an act that the actual thing done may escape moral discernment. Form replaces content as the focus of morality. This particular distortion of Zen drifted into the popular samurai code, for instance, where the issue of killing could be subordinated to the aesthetic beauty of how it was done. When properly wielded with the right state of mind, the samurai sword was unpolluted by the violence around it. The unfortunate moral consequence of this way of thinking was that the samurai often did not think of the morality of the violence itself.

Before leaving the topic of Japanese religion, a brief point should be made about Confucianism. Unlike traditional China, Confucianism was almost never a religious tradition in Japan. Rather, it functioned in the more limited sense of a moral and legal philosophy. In particular, Japanese Confucianism's primary function was the articulation and defense of social hierarchy and political centralism, along with the formalization of certain related ideas of duty and responsibility. The ideal and role of the Japanese emperor derived little of its spiritual power from the Chinese

Confucian tradition, however. Although it historically sometimes assumed a Confucian overlay, the Japanese emperor system is primarily a religious ideal derived from Shinto, not Confucianism.

To conclude, let us reflect on what our analysis has enabled us to understand. It is never easy to understand another culture. As we study Japan, we must be willing to suspend temporarily our own cherished cultural assumptions. We have tried to imagine ourselves into a context where intimacy is the defining characteristic of being human. For the Japanese, we are not primarily *homo sapiens*, the human being as wise or rational. Nor are we *homo faber*, human being as maker or creator. Nor *homo ludens*, human beings as the player of games. Rather, for the Japanese, we are primarily *homo intimans*, the expresser of intimacy. To the Japanese way of thinking, we are most human when we form bonds of belonging with nature, each other, our nation. We are most ourselves when we have built such a rapport that we need not speak in order to express ourselves. We are most ourselves when we suspend contrivance and let things be themselves, even helping the rock to be a rock by placing it where it belongs in a garden. We are most ourselves not when we know the world, but when we feel at home in it.

In conclusion, if we consider the religious ideas of self, bringing in all the Shinto, Buddhist, and Confucian notions at work in Japan, we have something like the following. What does it mean to be a developed person? It means going beyond an egoistic sense of independence to a recognition of the interdependent and dependent side of human existence. It means finding spiritual satisfaction in following a self-imposed ideal of discipline. It means resonating to the vibrations of nature, seeing yourself and the natural as belonging *with* each other, without nature belonging *to* humankind or humankind belonging to nature. It means having a common set of social patterns, hierarchical in nature, which binds us together as an organized society. And it means having a sense of belonging with a particular people, bound by blood, ritual, and familial affection.

If we stand back and look at this picture of human beings, comparing it with the ideals we Americans hold most dear, we start to fathom the depths of the problem of Japan-American relations. We find in the Japanese account no marked emphasis on any of the following: the individual (soul) as the primary unit of spiritual, moral, and political

meaning; the notion of a set of universal principles applying to all humankind as the ideal of behavior; the idea of legalistic, contractual relationship among persons or between a people and their God (Japan is a remarkably *Gemeinschaft* society); the idea of a divine plan worked out in natural and human history to which we feel responsible; the hierarchy of rationality as what sets off the human from other animals.

From the differences between these two lists, we see how difficult it will be for Japan and the United States to work together in harmony. How can we come to trust another human being when that person's very idea of human being differs so sharply from ours? But the world's very survival depends on our cooperation. We must somehow learn to recognize our cultural differences and yet also see our common humanity. We must learn to imagine being in each other's place. Only then can we really achieve the understanding requisite to trust and cooperation.

RESPONDENT: George Tanabe, University of Hawaii

Professor Kasulis has drawn a set of contrastive characteristics; on the one side, he refers to intimacy as something personal, internal, affective, physical, and involving unself-conscious action. On the other side are characteristics that can be described as public, external, intellectual, with an emphasis on the mind, and valuing self-conscious, reflective dogmas. Professor Kasulis has characterized the differences between Japan and the West in the following terms--Japan emphasizing more the first set of characteristics and the West embodying more the second set. It is clear that Professor Kasulis is not setting these contrasts up as opposites, saying that Japan is one way and the West is the other. He stated very clearly at the beginning that this is a matter of emphasis, a matter of foreground and background; but still, there is a clear difference of emphasis.

It is not too clear to me how much of a difference there is between Japan and the West. His examples of intimacy and intimate knowledge draw upon very common experiences. He draws upon experiences we can all identify with, and it would almost seem that Professor Kasulis was arguing that we are as much involved with intimate knowledge as the

Japanese.

If these two sets of characteristics describe different ways of knowing between Japanese and Westerners, if these two characterizations are true, my next question would be, "When were they true, and are they still true?" It may be that the *nakoodo* (go-between) used to arrange a meeting between a likely couple; but, having been a *nakoodo* myself and knowing other people who have been also, I know I had nothing to do with arranging a meeting between the people, and I know that they, like many people in the West, began their relationship as two independent strangers meeting and falling in love.

A second example is contracts. Since when has it been that Japan functions without contracts? I just signed a contract with a Japanese publisher three months ago, and I was amazed at how detailed and specific it was--far more detailed and specific than the contract I signed with the University of Hawaii Press. I would suggest that perhaps this characterization of the Japanese way of thinking, i.e. as being intuitive, or intimate, to use Professor Kasulis' word, and, on the other side, the Western way of thinking as more rational and intellectual is an old way of characterizing the differences between our two cultures. This was the message of D. T. Suzuki. D. T. Suzuki made this characterization very popular. I would suggest, however, that it has perhaps outlived its usefulness and that we should recognize that there is too much of an emphasis being placed upon the intimate side by Professor Kasulis, as there was too much emphasis placed upon the intuitive side by D. T. Suzuki.

Earlier, the issue was raised regarding the uniqueness of the Japanese; I might mention that this characterization is becoming quite popular in Japan. Some of you might be familiar with the work of the Jungian psychologist, Hayao Kawai, who is becoming well known for his theory on the uniqueness of the Japanese psyche. If you read his work, it sounds just like Professor Kasulis' list of characteristics that define intimacy. In this case it would be in terms of the Japanese psyche. It seems that Professor Kasulis is making a case for a rather unique, Japanese way of thinking.

Professor Kasulis describes Shinto in terms of these characteristics, i.e. as being innately, intimately Japanese as opposed to being universal,

as emphasizing rituals and feelings vs. a system of beliefs or doctrines, and being more emotional than it is rational.

It is not that this characterization is untrue, but I wonder if we may be placing too much of an emphasis upon the side of intimacy. Rather we should also look at another part of Shinto which is just as much a part of it as is pausing at a roadside shrine out of habit, without a clear conscious reason. In contrast, I would like to point out the many traditions in which Shinto has been very explicitly articulated, argued, defended, and accommodated or separated from Confucianism or Buddhism. There are very clearly identifiable forms of Shinto; for example Yuitsu Shinto, Watarai Shinto, Suika Shinto, Yoshikawa Shinto, and on and on and on, each with its own set of doctrines and rationales.

I remember a conference held about five years ago whose participants included Buddhist and Shinto scholars and priests. The Shinto contingent at the conference was most intent upon proving that Shinto was a universal religion, that it was not just limited to the Japanese, that it was universal. The Shinto priest of Hiyoshi shrine, Miwa Takahide wrote, "If Shinto is to become a mature religion with real possibilities for the future, it must overcome its premodern character and gain by its encounter with the Western sense of value. It is also necessary to regenerate Shinto and make it an international religion that has possibilities reaching beyond the limits of race." Here we have a very clear statement of an understanding of Shinto. Though it may be just a hope or a dream for Shinto, it certainly sees Shinto as being capable of universalizing and being applicable to peoples other than Japanese.

Professor Kasulis also portrayed Shinto intimacy as an innocent child which can be appropriated by evil, cunning politicians and whose innocent set of feelings and emotions can be distorted into political ideology. I would suggest that this distortion which most certainly did take place many times in Japanese history, beginning I suppose with the *Kojiki* and the *Nihon Shoki*, when the myth of the divine descent of the emperor was clearly articulated, took place from within Shinto as much as it was used by cunning politicians from the outside appropriating Shinto for their own ends. The great theorists of those ideas were every bit as much Shinto priests and scholars, and not at all cunning politicians. So if this kind of distortion takes place, it has taken place within Shinto, a

part of Shinto just as the unarticulated innocent side is also a part of Shinto. So I am arguing for a more balanced view in which both sets of characteristics are important.

Finally, on Buddhism, Professor Kasulis talks about Shin Buddhism and Zen Buddhism in terms of intimacy. For Shin Buddhism it is an intimacy which is had upon surrender of oneself to the power of Amida Buddha. In Zen Buddhism it is an intimacy which derives from an acceptance of reality as it really is. Here we see that intimacy is defined in terms of these spiritual realities. It is a kind of metaphysical intimacy, intimacy with Amida, intimacy with reality as it is. I wonder what happens in Buddhism to intimacy with people? In contrast to our working definition of intimacy as making known to a close friend what is innermost, one of the most striking characteristics of Japanese Buddhism is sectarianism which sets Buddhists against Buddhists, person against person, and which most certainly cannot be described as being a phenomenon of intimacy. One of the most adamantly sectarian of Buddhist groups is Jodo Shinshu, one of the groups Professor Kasulis mentions. Not only do they insist on their superiority over other forms of Buddhism, but they also have a very well-defined mechanism for defining heresy from within. In this case, it is not merely an example of a group setting themselves apart and against other Buddhists, but of being able to do that even within their own sect. Dogen himself, the founder of Soto Zen, left Kamakura for the countryside and set up his own temple Eiheiji, because he did not want to make compromises. He did not want to be intimate with those who did not share his own view. There is a quite remarkable history of doctrinal debates between almost every combination of sects which never resulted in anything but increased animosity between Buddhists. The organizational chart of every sect is quite complicated, with groups, subgroups, and subsubgroups. This of course is a result of failure to be intimate, to share in something which is innermost and deep. Another extreme example is Nichiren. Was he an aberration or was he typical?

Of course there is intimacy within one's own group. There are many examples of intimacy, but we should not forget that one of the roots of Japanese Buddhist behavior is, in addition to intimacy, a great animosity which is felt towards other Buddhists who are too intimate with

the wrong spiritual entity.

In summary, I question the adequacy and usefulness of this notion of intimacy and the overemphasis which is placed upon it. Again, it is not that it is untrue. I completely agree that the concept is an important one in Japanese religion, but I want to emphasize that it is not complete. Perhaps we are not giving due emphasis to the other side of the story, i.e. in that which is public, external, intellectual, self-conscious, reflective, contractual, argumentative, and universal.

DISCUSSION & QUESTIONS:

LEBRA: I was quite impressed with Professor Kasulis' presentation. Perhaps I can be a go-between to bridge these two somewhat contrasting views. I think Professor Kasulis' emphasis on intimacy provides insight into Japanese behavior and culture in general. At the same time, Professor Tanabe's point does make sense; however, I do not agree that the concept of intimacy should be discarded. Let me begin with an anecdote. I have been exposed to only a small portion of the culture of the elderly in the United States, mainly because my husband and I used to visit his mother in a nursing home every week until she passed away. One day we heard about an incident in which a woman was furious with a man who had made sexual advances toward her. We thought she was mad because she was indignant that he would do such a thing, but it turned out that she was mad because he did the same thing to another woman.

This example illustrates that, by definition, intimacy is intimacy because of its exclusiveness. Once this close relationship is generously shared, then it ceases to be intimate. Therefore, sharing is not a part of it, and strong boundaries have to be built up in order to protect it. The insider-outsider division in a culture where intimacy is very important naturally is very strong. One example of this is gender. A Japanese woman's problem is being shut out of the network of male intimacy. In a work setting, the men have already established a small intimate group and it is very difficult for her to break into it. In the same way, those who have been away from their workplace or company due to being stationed abroad for a long time, have a difficult time reintegrating into the home

base where intimate ties have been built up during their absence.

Regarding Professor Tanabe's mention of contractual specification, that is seen as necessary between those who do not share intimacy. Indeed, it is very necessary to maintain the value of intimacy itself. Sectarianism, i.e. the hostility between sects, also is very much a part of the culture of intimacy. The emperor, for example, is not supposed to be intimate with anybody, because this would create exclusiveness and favoritism. The Emperor Hirohito was a totally public symbol, with no intimacy. He would not look directly at anybody in public. His whole presentation was totally non-intimate. If there was anything he could be intimate with it was god, his own ancestor. This communion with the ancestor Amaterasu or whoever, was completely exclusive, very secret, and nobody could share it with him. The main point I want to make is that these two points of view, i.e. the intimate and the non-intimate, are really complementary to each other.

KATO: Professor Kasulis, I really appreciated your very enlightening presentation. One basic question I would like to ask is how do you translate "intimacy" into Japanese. I was thinking it could be *shinkinkan*, *shitashisa*, or *chikashisa*, because we do not have that exact concept in Japanese.

KASULIS: Yes, that is a crucial point. First, if a culture really emphasized intimacy, but believed that it is not established by theoretical reflection, you would not have a word or a concept for it. It would be a mode of relating, not something you talk about. When I discuss it in Japanese, I use *shitashimi* or *shinmitsu*. *Shinmitsu* has a sense of closeness and the meaning of parent, which is a very powerful symbol. The Japanese word for intimacy has the character for parent in it. I think it is significant that Amida Buddha is often referred to as *Oyasama*, which is understood as parent, but which could also literally be "the intimate one." Secondly, the "mitsu" character has the idea of secret, closed, things that Professor Lebra identified. So *shinmitsu* is a word I often use to express both of these concepts. I intentionally avoid using the Japanese word so I can use a word that is understood.

It is a matter of foreground and background. We can always find in Japan the same things we find in the West, but the question is which is the foreground and which is the background? Professor Lebra's point

regarding contracts reiterates this point, i.e. when intimacy is in the foreground, there is no need for a contract, but when intimacy is pushed to the background because the parties are not in an intimate relationship, then the contract becomes important. One noteworthy clause in a traditional Japanese contract states that "If either party should come to the conclusion that the other party is not living up to their end of the agreement, the two parties will enter into discussion in good faith." You will not find this in Western contracts. In Japan there is a different sense of what a contract is and what happens when a contract breaks down. When you realize that the total number of attorneys in Japan is approximately the number we graduate in the U.S. every year, it becomes clear that we have a contract culture. The way the Japanese deal with contracts really is quite different from the way we use them.

SEIDENSTICKER: I just want to point out that, regarding Professor Kato's question about the lack of a Japanese word for intimacy, there are numbers of concepts, and these include the most universal concepts, for which there really are not exact equivalents. The concepts really are not concepts. They are feelings, the air you breathe, the communality people feel for each other. An excellent example is that word "nature." We all agree, and it is always being said, and I think said truly, that the Japanese have a sense of kinship with nature, and it is basic and central to Shinto. It is a feeling; this is not to say that we in the West hate nature, or that we are not sensitive to nature, but it is something that we do not have in the same degree. But you know, the Japanese do not have a word for nature. Ask a Japanese what nature is, and he will immediately answer *shizen*. But *shizen* is a word made in the Meiji period. Before the Meiji, the Japanese did not have a word for nature. They had an adverb *shizen ni*, which meant something like automatically, but not *shizen* as a noun indicating nature. When we started talking about nature, they decided they had to have a word for it, and so they coined one. This is an instance of the same kind of thing, I think.

TANABE: The same thing is true for the word religion, i.e. *shukyo* which is another made-up word. I never realized it until Professor Lebra pointed it out, but the intimacy and animosity really do go together. You really cannot separate one from the other.

To go back to Professor Kato's question, in religious terms, i.e. in

Buddhist terms, I would use the word *shuha*, meaning sect. Of course, this is not the word for intimacy, but it shows that people define themselves not only in terms of people they are close to, but also in terms of those with whom they differ. This sectarianism is extremely strong in defining intimacy between people in a group in terms of other people with whom they are not intimate. Thank you Professor Lebra for your observation that the two really go hand in hand.

JANSEN: I have a question for Professor Kasulis, whose exposition I found extremely interesting and articulate. This insistence on the nonverbal, rejection of the reasoned or rational as the path to truth, has also been criticized as a position favored by the establishment in order to rule out reasoned objections or protests. I wonder what your response is to that.

KASULIS: I think compromise and consensus-building are Japanese cultural traits that institutions have drawn on as a way to inhibit protest, but I do not think it is entirely a political device. It is something more basic, at the roots of Japanese behavior, so to speak. Criticism has to be done in a different way in order to be effective.

KOBAYASHI: I was very struck by Professor Lebra's statement that intimacy by its very nature must be exclusive. I think there is an economy of intimacy in everyday life. You cannot have so many friends that you have to spend all your life just dropping by for no reason. In that sense, practically speaking, intimacy is necessarily exclusive, but this wreaks havoc when we talk about internationalism, Christianity, or Buddhism. Perhaps this idea that intimacy by its very nature is exclusive is something that is emphasized in Japan, but that may be one of the dangers in Japanese thinking.

SAKAI: I think that in the words of Professor Jansen, we tend to polarize a little too much when actually in Japan we have such a variety of behavior patterns. For example, contractually, in the Edo period or Tokugawa period, the contractual documents show amazing detail. They are not too different from Western contracts. On the other hand, on the level of my personal contacts with Japanese, sometimes I encounter very detailed contracts and other times it is not discussed. I go to Japan quite often to give lectures. Twelve hours of lecturing or so requires many many hours of preparation, yet I never have talked about a contract. I

never know how much I will be paid, if anything. It could be zero, but I know I will get something. This is an example of transactions in a personal relationship.

If you enter an institutional relationship, then it is a different situation. If you are dealing on a personal level within an institution, it is also different from dealing with the institution in the abstract. In that case, especially if it is a modern institution, then the relationship would be contractual. When I counsel teachers of English whom I have recommended to Japanese universities, I warn them not to discuss money matters, or how many hours of vacation, etc. We tend to want to specify these things in detail, but this is not the Japanese style. There must be trust that they will treat you right. Americans become very unhappy if they do not have these details laid out. A second area of concern is developing friendships. They can make friends, but they cannot become integrated into the faculty group. They are faculty guests, and as faculty guests they are never part of that intimate faculty group. In this kind of group the people discuss things because they are of one mind, and an outsider would be out of place.

WHITE: I would like to discuss the downside of the intimacy question in an institutional context. This kind of intimacy depends on being 100% committed, on being there, face to face. This ends up being a big problem for individuals, especially women, part-timers, or returnees from overseas. Belonging in this sense is not an abstract or contractual arrangement, but rather it is part of a whole set of values involving trust and especially predictability which may be another aspect of intimacy.

KABAYAMA: I was also very impressed by Professor Kasulis' presentation. I would just like to add to the discussion of intimacy that it is also a notable feature in Mediterranean cultures of Europe. So it seems that this sentiment also exists among Western peoples as well.

IV. HOW THEY LEARN: CULTURAL VALUES AND EDUCATION IN JAPAN

Merry White, Boston University

Education has been a very important topic in the U.S.-Japan rhetorical combat. Americans are both dazzled and threatened by how Japanese children learn. The results of both educational mobilization and family socialization are extraordinary on any terms, and we hear a lot about this. It has been said that the Japanese high school graduate is as well educated as an American college graduate. College entrance examinations test high school seniors at a level about equivalent to the third year of specialized courses in an American university. It is also impressive that a foreman on the factory floor can expect any worker to understand statistical material, work from complex graphs and charts, and perform statistical mathematical operations.

These results make many Americans uneasy, especially those affected by tradewar politics, the declining American economy, and resultant protectionism. I wrote a book about Japanese children which the publisher insisted on calling *The Japanese Educational Challenge*. It was felt that we might attract people who wanted to confirm their stereotypes about Japan, especially those who believed that the Japanese were involved in a campaign to win in the schools as well as in trade. But the book is not about threats and challenges in this sense, and the intention was to use Japan as a mirror, and not a blueprint or a call to arms. The response has been interesting: feelings are volatile out there, even in the less than high profile world of education, and some Americans are quick to blame Japan--and even to say that the Japanese child isn't fair--just as they have said that Japan's automobile industry isn't fair. But I've tried to promote a more thorough look at the factors in Japanese culture and values which contribute to education. In other words, I want to complicate the question of challenge by emphasizing cultural factors .

Culture is a tricky term: it is not the same as tradition, unless you can see tradition as changing, for culture indeed changes. As Pat Steinhoff has noted, there is nothing inevitable about the ways in which culture is put to use, and we are not talking here about what Eric Wolf describes as an "ethnocentric, culture-bound notion of common moral impulses,

common values, located like a little pacemaker in each person's heart in a society."

Roots are of course cultural, but also involve institutions, history, economics, the weather and vast geopolitical influences as well. And culture in all these areas is often very explicitly invoked in Japan. Japanese children are taught, both informally and formally, that they have roots--that Japan is a special place in all these contexts, and, more, that being Japanese involves one in what I might call "cultural responsibilities"--a more conscious definition of values and qualities seen as important to good human relationships and identity explicitly in the context of being Japanese.

I'm interested in the fit between culturally determined idea about learning and the socialization and training that go on in home and school, and the ideas themselves--the folk psychology or folk pedagogy that parents and teachers use in home and school--root values as both content and methods.

I'd like to go a little more deeply into the principles and values guiding parents and teachers in engaging children in the work of learning. These principles, derived from local values and cultural concepts of development and learning,distinguish Japanese schools and homes from those of Western industrialized countries--these values are what make the Japanese child modern but not Western. Beginning at birth, Japanese ideas about children are very different from those of American parents. The Japanese baby is seen to be born with no particular abilities or disabilities, and this blank slate is seen to be the mother's responsibility: the mother's role is to provide appropriate environment and support--the engine driving the child's development. If little is innate, and all is possible, what is needed is effort. How the mother achieves a child who will be willing to work hard is an important part of the story of the high test scores.

The psychologist William Caudill said that the American mother sees her newborn as a dependent being, needing to be trained to be independent, while the Japanese mother sees the baby as having separated from her, needing to be trained into appropriate dependency. The first step is physical closeness, and the Japanese-English word "skinship" describes the skin to skin closeness which is particularly valued. Babies are almost

never left alone in a crib or playpen--and are always taken with the mother, and alternative caretakers are used rather little. There are no babysitters as such. Time spent with the baby is also valued as such. In studies comparing mothering in the U.S. and Japan, the data indicate that American mothers spend less time just being with the child in the same room, and Japanese parents prefer to have their baby sleep in the same room, whereas American parents go to what seem to Japanese observers to be great lengths to have the child sleep in a separate room .

American mothers will busily go in and out of a baby's room, neatening, doing things perhaps unrelated to the specific care of the child. A Japanese mother will sit quietly by the side of the baby, or even lie down beside a napping infant. The American mother might rub the baby's back until he or she falls asleep, or sing to him, but will stop when he or she falls asleep. A Japanese mother will continue to pat the baby, rock or carry him or her long after the baby has drifted off. One could say that the American sees her role as a set of discrete tasks, a sort of checklist, such as "getting the baby to sleep," and the Japanese mother sees herself as "being with the baby." So sitting by the sleeping baby is not time wasted but part of her role. The home study desk parents buy later for children also symbolizes this availability. There is a high front and half sides, cutting out distractions and enclosing the workspace in womb-like protection. There is a built-in study light, shelves, a clock, electric pencil sharpener and built-in calculator. The most popular model a few years ago also had a pushbutton connecting to a bell in the kitchen to summon mother for help or a snack.

While this closeness--what an American psychologist would call "merging"--is important, so is the bridge the mother must provide to the outside world. She gradually exposes the baby to the norms of social and institutional settings. The norms of good mothering are set by the *seken*, the community of neighbors, kin, teachers--all those who will measure her and her child. This *seken* is not a group with an active membership but is a kind of "what will the neighbors say?" watchful normative presence.

Attending to a child's character and predilections, socializing him to the values of society while cementing the special bond with her is a time consuming task and results in the definition of mothering as a full-time

job. The relationship prepares the child for other relationships, and especially for the importance of appropriate dependency in relationships, but part of the mother's task is to make her relationship with her child unlike all others he will encounter. She encourages him to see the difference between the *uchi* (inside) of the home and the *soto* of the outside world and reminds him that the outside will have different expectations. Her total, unconditional support of the child may appear to us as a spoiling sort of indulgence, and it is hard for us to see how the child could be motivated to work if he is so cossetted and protected. I might quote Sadaharu Oh, the famous baseball player, on this point: in his *Autobiography* he says that it is through being indulged and nurtured that he was fired up to work hard to overcome his weaknesses on the field and to devise, among other things, his own batting stance, so that he continually broke his own records: he says, "Dependency warms the heart but it also enables you to work twice as hard, to overcome the siren songs of laziness." We find it hard to understand that the dependent situation created by lifetime employment and security could create productive workers. Americans feel that insecurity is a powerful incentive, but in Japan the assurance of security is motivating.

The good child, the *ii ko*, is differently conceived in the United States and Japan. Independence and individual self-expression have priority as overt values in our child rearing. And while the capacity to cooperate and work in teams comes up on American children's report cards, these are never seen to take precedence, and cooperation may, in fact, be a second-class value, however useful for classroom management. Further, the phrase, "works to the best of his/her ability" figures often in teachers' reports here. Yet, because ambivalence exists between the idea that one has innate ceilings on abilities and the idea that one can infinitely improve oneself, or at least infinitely change the specific environment in which one tests one's abilities, doing one's best is hard to define. One avoids the uncomfortable assessment that a failing child is doing his best.

We instead assume that there's better in the child somewhere, and if performance is poor, we may choose to blame environmental factors, such as a broken family, illness, poverty, rather than motivation and effort, as do the Japanese. A Japanese child doesn't say "Well, I did my best" and expect an understanding acceptance from adults.

So what is an *ii ko*? Japanese child-rearing values emphasize both the child's personal characteristics and the means by which a child accomplishes his goals. Let us examine some of the terms which are used to describe a good child. Most frequently cited are *otonashii* (mild, gentle), *sunao* (I'll talk in a minute about this word frequently mistranslated as "obedient"), *akarui* (bright), *genki*, (lively, spirited), and *hakihaki* (brisk, prompt, clear) and *oriko* (obedient, smart). This first set of terms sets out goals for personal development, encouraged through proper socialization.

A second group includes terms that describe the means by which a child's development is advanced both personally and socially. These imply a psychological theory and the activity through which the cultural theory of child development is implemented. Among these terms are *gambaru* (persist), *hansei suru* (reflect critically on oneself), and *wakaraseru*, (getting the child to understand). These terms encompass strategies to be used in mother-child relationships (mainly nurturant) and teacher-student (mainly didactic) that are in some ways congruent with American categories of development--which we tend to compartmentalize as cognitive, emotional and behavioral development. But there remain markedly different conceptions about the proper training of children, notions loosely called indulgence and patience, practiced to achieve ends we have inaccurately translated as obedience and submission .

The important point is that there is in Japan little conflict between the goals of social integration and culturally appropriate modes of self-fulfillment. The bridge between them lies in the relationship between mother and child. This relationship embodies Japanese ideas of nurturance and indulgence. A mother is expected to recognize and be sensitive to her child's individual personality and inclinations; and yet, she is not supposed to encourage a child to be idiosyncratic. Knowing that your son is self-willed and independent means that you know what strategy you must use with him to get him to cooperate; it does not mean that you reinforce or value the quality in itself. The outcome of all of this is a highly nurturant indulgence in the mother-child relationship that is not only congruent with social discipline and order but actually contributes to it.

Let us look at the word *sunao*, which, as I said, has no simple translation into English, though dictionaries frequently give "obedient" as its meaning. It would be more appropriate to approach its use through a

cluster of meanings given by Japanese teachers and mothers, and these include: "open-minded," "nonresistant," "truthful," or as one writer says, "authentic in intent and cooperative in spirit."

It is very hard to catch the nuances in English: naivete, naturalness, simplicity, mildness, gentleness and straightforwardness are part of the meaning. One Japanese mother said, "It means obedient if I see my child as bad; it means autonomous if he is good." She also noted that most mothers see their children as naturally good, needing only proper care to grow up "straight." The English translation, obedience, implies to Americans subordination and lack of self determination, but asserts that for Japanese *sunao* "assumes cooperation to be an act of affirmation of the self."

Thus, a child who is *sunao* has not sacrificed his personal autonomy for the sake of cooperation. Cooperating does not imply giving up the self, as it may in the West, but in fact implies that working with others is the appropriate means by which one expresses and enhances oneself.

Another term, related to *sunao*, seems contradictory and is hard for Americans to understand, given our childrearing assumptions. This is *yutaka* meaning "empathic," receptive or open hearted. Again, first appearances are deceiving. *Yutaka* has a very positive, active connotation and implies a mature vigor. Empathic sensitivity and anticipation of the needs of others may sound passive and feminine to Western ears, but *yutaka* is heartier and confident, and implies receiving and giving in abundance, enjoyment of life within the social group, and caring for others' needs.

How one raises a *sunao* child with a *yutaka* spirit who can also engage himself in tests of endurance and effort involves the technique of *wakaraseru*. "Getting the child to understand," engages the child in the goals of the mother, and the chief principle seems to be never to go against the child. Where an American might see manipulation of the child through indulgence as preventing him from having a strong will of his own, the Japanese mother sees long-term benefits of self-motivated cooperation from keeping the child happy and engaged. In Western terms, Japanese methods of discipline are "love-oriented" rather than "power-assertive."

The Western belief that sparing the rod spoils the child obviously assumes that discipline is good for the child in the long run, and not just for the immediate correction of a misdeed or fault. But "I'm only doing this because I love you" and "It hurts me more than it hurts you" aren't heard much in Japan. There is, however, a notion that a child benefits from experiencing hardship. *Kuroo saseta hoo ga ii* (it's good to experience hardship) is a very common expression. *Kuroo* is said to deepen and mature the self, but it also removes self-centeredness. *Kuroo* can be psychological, physical, or environmental and, although small children are protected from it, the *kuroo* of intensive study, or the wholehearted application of one's energies at the expense of pleasures, is said to be good at least for the older child.

Suffering itself is not the point. Enduring is more important. The term *gambaru* is frequently used and teachers invariably say to parents, "*moo sukoshi gambaru hoo ga ii to omoimasu.*" (It would be good if he/she could struggle a little more.") Japanese persistence, which Western observers think is central to the Japanese personality, is not, as we might have it, the product of narrow vision, masochism, fatalism or a lack of free will. The difference between Western and Japanese concepts of effort and personal commitment must be understood if we want to explain how our respective children's goals and performances vary. As Ruth Benedict pointed out, discipline is a culturally determined concept, and while Westerners perceive discipline, like obedience, as necessary but potentially self-negating, Japanese see full engaged discipline as refining and enhancing the self.

For us, individualism is based on the idea of unconstrained individual free choice, and the "free" is more important than the commitment to a "choice." The idea of compelling oneself to delay gratification and to endure for endurance's sake seems to many Westerners a pointless sacrifice. But Japanese do not experience it this way, nor do they experience committed struggle as lonely. One never needs to endure alone.

One's health is an important factor in all this. People believe that "the body can take it if the will is strong." Since the body will be subjected to trials, however, mothers and teachers consider health and accompanying physical strength as critically important to the child's ability to endure. In

short, adults feel responsible for the child's physical well-being. Thus, children are fed well, exhorted to exercise, and encouraged to test their bodies. One 6th grader in Tokyo writes: "Above all, I became physically strong. . . During the 3rd grade, I tried to wear a short-sleeved shirt just like my friends in the winter. It was cold, but I endured it. I did the same during my fourth and fifth grades. Then I realized I was becoming much healthier." Teachers and parents worry that children are now pampered and that, because of the stress on study over physical exercise, older children, especially, are weak.

The famous exhortation to high schoolers, "pass with four and fail with five" means that if one is so lazy as to sleep five hours rather than four, one will fail the exams. Going without sleep is not seen as a problem, for, if healthy, the body is seen as able to endure and recover.

At least the Japanese body is so regarded. When Westerners entered a Zen temple in Kyoto and found the entrance requirements of silent kneeling meditation for 48 hours too difficult, the temple created a double standard: Japanese must meditate for 48 hours, but Westerners are only expected to manage 24.

Another form of Japanese self discipline, encouraged in school and throughout life, is *hansei* (self-examination and reflection). This is both personal and social. A child is encouraged to examine him or herself and to seek out sources of weakness. Since Japanese do not like to criticize others *hansei* is all the more important. When an entire class engages in *hansei* together, the class examines relationships, goals and behavior, and then develops a plan of action for changing things. *Hansei*, in short, is oriented toward improvement.

The mother's good child is displaced a bit by the tougher road of personal effort and more deliberate group focus, especially in secondary schools. American stereotypes of Japanese education, however, assume that the child experiences heavy discipline and competition in the school and that pressure to succeed characterizes the classroom environment.

I would say, however, that the high scores Japanese children achieve in math and science are not the product of a rigid authoritarian classroom, but the result of a number of factors. One of these is the important role given to feelings in cognitive development in the school. There is a strong relationship between the supportive and nurturant

atmosphere of learning and the high performance and achievement outcomes in Japan. It is recognized that children's commitment to work must be generated through a supportive, positive relationship with teachers and classmates, through a positive perspective on his or her own capabilities, and through minimizing invidious comparisons and competition between children.

A look at Japanese classrooms is interesting. What first strikes the Western observer is the noise and activity level. An American teacher walking into a fourth grade science class in Japan would be horrified: children are all talking at once, leaping and calling for the teacher's attention--the American's response is to wonder, "who's in control of this room?" But if you could understand the content of the lively chatter, you'd see that all the noise and movement is focussed on the work itself--children are shouting out answers, suggesting methods, exclaiming in excitement over results--not gossiping, teasing or planning games for recess. The teacher is standing on one side, correcting papers or consulting with individual children. He is not concerned over the noise, as long as it is the result of this engagement and, in fact, may measure his success by such manifestations. By the way, William Cummings has estimated that American teachers spend about 60% of class time in organizing, controlling, and disciplining the class while Japanese teachers spend only 10%.

Rote learning, memorization and drill are not often part of class activities. And one reason for this is that children spend out of school time in homework, memorizing so that classroom time can be used for discovery and application. I should add here that, while Japanese children score high on international tests in terms of functional information, they excel by even greater margins in tests of understanding, application and hypothesis formation, especially in math and science.

A description of one fifth grade math class will reveal some elements of the pedagogy. The class was presented with a general statement about cubing. Before any concrete facts, formulae, or even drawings were displayed, the teacher asked the class to take out their math diaries and spend a few minutes writing down their feelings and anticipations over this new concept. It is hard for me to imagine an American math teacher beginning a lesson with an exhortation to examine

one's emotional predispositions about cubing. That may only be because my own math training was before the flood.

After that, the teacher asks for conjectures from the children about the surface and volume of a cube and asks for some ideas about formulae for calculation. The teacher asks the class to cluster into its component *han* or work groups of four or five children each, and gives out a wide variety of materials for measurement and construction. One group leaves the room with large pieces of cardboard, to construct a model of a cubic meter. The groups internally work on solutions to problems set by the teacher and compete with each other to finish first. After a while, the cubic meter group returns, groaning under the bulk of their model, and everyone gasps over its size--there are many comments and guesses about how many children could fit inside. The teacher now sets the whole class a very challenging problem, well over their heads, and gives them the rest of the class time to work on it. The class ends without a solution but the teacher has made no particular effort to get or give an answer, although she has exhorted them to be energetic. By the way, it might be several days before the class gets the answer--there is no deadline but the excitement doesn't flag.

Several points in this description deserve highlighting. First, the combination of attention to feelings, the provision of facts, and opportunities for discovery. The teacher prefers to focus on process, engagement, and performance rather than on discipline (in our sense) and product. Second, the *han:* assignments are made to groups called *han*, not to individuals (this is also true at the workplace) although individual progress and achievement are closely monitored. Children are supported, praised and allowed to make mistakes through trial and error within the group. The group is also pitted against other groups and the group's success is each person's triumph, and vice versa.

The point I want to make here is that Japanese teachers recognize the role of feelings in learning and stress the emotional as well as the intellectual aspects of engagement. To engage the child's commitment and motivate his or her effort is the teacher's primary task. This emphasis is most explicit in elementary and middle schools but persists as a very strong subcurrent later as a prerequisite for the self-discipline children employ in high school.

Among the criticisms of Japanese education in the American media accounts is the statement that there is no individualism, no creativity encouraged in Japanese schools. And all of the effort, it is said, is in service to the economic success of the nation, not for the development of the child. There are a few realities behind these stereotypes: in high school, as opposed to primary and early secondary schools, the study plan does not permit as much deviation and children are not streamed by ability. For the geniuses, there may indeed be a problem, for there is little provision for tracking them to their best advantage. The superbright may indeed be disadvantaged.

On the other hand, creativity and innovation are encouraged in Japan, but their manifestations may be different from those an American observer would expect. Creativity to an American involves a necessary break with traditional content and methods and implies the creation of a new idea or artifact or, at the least, independent invention, and the myth is that only independent people, lone wolves, are real inventors. Whether creativity is in the child, or in the teaching to be transmitted to the child, and how it is to be measured, are questions no one has satisfactorily answered. Why we emphasize it is another question, and it is probably related to our theories of progress and the importance we attach to unique accomplishments, to the Henry Fords and Albert Einsteins, to push society and knowledge forward. The fact is, however, that our schools do, if anything, less to encourage creativity than do the Japanese, especially in the arts.

Americans generally agree that creativity is desirable and important, but we're confused about how to get it. One perspective from our folk psychology maintains that children possess the potential for considerable creativity, but that this may diminish as they grow older. In this view, overly rigid education and the imposition of adult standards are frequently considered to be the culprits in suppressing children's spontaneously different and unorthodox ways of looking at the world. Unorthodox means creative.

There is a built-in contradiction here: even as we plan curricula for creativity, we believe that creative invention cannot be fostered institutionally. This idea comes both from nineteenth century romanticism and from twentieth century expressionism. In the latter, the

child is to be completely unrestrained and left to his or her own nature. He or she is to be driven by a naive force, what we might call the "immaculate perception." In my own childhood, I remember a very great scandal at my elementary school, a John Dewey-influenced school in Chicago, which erupted when parents discovered that the art teacher was actually sketching on top of our drawings.

From the romantics we understand that the best creations come to the artist through the inspiration of the *divinus furor*, the divine fury which visits the worthy creator from heaven. He or she has, of course, earned this intervention through hard work and suffering. We perhaps confuse self-expression with creativity when we place the greatest value on spontaneity rather than on taking pains, and, in the extreme form of this notion, "creative training" seems a contradiction in terms. Where we appreciate hard work leading to creative success, it is still isolated from formal schooling, as in our own creation myths of the self-made man, little or poorly schooled, building an internal combustion engine in his woodshed. Edison's claim that invention is 1% inspiration, 99% perspiration was a mainstay of such legends but has little to do with our ideas of creation in schools today.

Why is Japanese creativity of such concern to Americans? Part of the interest may stem from protectionism and the corollary need to find a flaw in Japanese successes: we cast about for some intangible yet crucial capacity or quality which we can reassure ourselves is lacking in Japanese mentality, society or education and which will allow the U.S. to retain, or regain, the upper hand.

American popular opinion maintains that the Japanese are less creative but this is the result of our cultural differences in the consideration of the fostering of creativity. Americans believe, as I said, that creativity is an individual act or product, whereas Japanese culture emphasizes this less and encourages group accomplishments which involve a certain degree of conformity and cooperation. Further, Americans, for all our egalitarian sympathies and our emphasis on equal opportunity, do not believe at heart that we are all born equal in abilities. As I said, Japanese do in fact believe far more than we do in innate equality, in the child as a blank slate, to be developed by the environment--in which nothing should be left to chance by the adults responsible for

his development. While we ask a child to "do your best," with the implication of a ceiling imposed by the child's capacities, the Japanese use external standards and believe that, with motivated effort, (which, by the way, is seen as the most important factor in academic and other successes), a child can accomplish just about anything. Of course, the examination process in Japan places a kind of ascriptive ceiling on getting ahead. You can be marked for life by this one moment of the entrance exam. Up to that point, the assumption (if not the reality) is that anyone can do it.

In school, Japanese children are given the tools, methods and practical acquaintance with the media of artistic expression: all learn two instruments, everyone can read music, all are trained in the use of visual arts materials, and electives are offered in other arts after regular school hours. Originality is seen to come after proficiency. It is true, though, that if everyone must be a soloist or composer to be considered creative, then most Japanese are not encouraged to be creative.

In arts, music, and in all subjects, children learn to work carefully and precisely, to finish one task before beginning another, to work with a goal in mind, and to endure many repetitions until they have perfected a task. This relates to traditional craft learning where an apprentice will be kept at a small preliminary task for many months--Thomas Rohlen has pointed out that in Japan; freedom to create comes as the endproduct of years of devotion to mastery of established forms and is not seen as the prerequisite for artistic expression. Very small children are taught step by step the routines of the classroom until they are perfected. Academic subjects are virtually ignored for many weeks until first graders learn the precise way to do things in school--and feel accomplished in doing so. They are taught that process is at least as important as product. Victor Kobayashi has noted that Japanese children and people learning traditional crafts are taught that each repetition of a process contains something new. They learn to discriminate tiny variations in routines as they are repeated. They are exhorted to "see the form, but then see through the form to improve it."

It is difficult to talk about Japanese elementary school education without praising it, but the problems that you have heard about Japanese education do exist--although mostly in secondary schools; and what is

more, even where they exist, they seem slight to Americans when they see the data.

Japanese parents are critical and watchful of their schools and are not complacent about their children's successes. There was a telling example of this lack of complacency in Harold Stevenson's comparative study of American and Japanese education. Mothers of elementary school students in Minneapolis and Sendai, roughly comparable cities, were asked to evaluate their children's school experiences. The Minneapolis mothers consistently answered that the schools were fine and that their children were doing well, while the Sendai mothers were very critical of their schools and worried that their children were not performing up to their potential. You don't need to be told whose children were, in objective tests, doing better? The Sendai group--in fact, so much better that the poorest performer in the Japanese group was well ahead of the best in the American group.

The statistical level of pathological symptoms and behavior among school age children (and their mothers) is, contrasted to America, a very low one indeed--at least in comparison with American delinquency patterns and other juvenile socio- and psychopathologies. The arrests for juvenile crime reported among school age children in Osaka in one year, for example, are equal to those reported in one day in New York.

But the Japanese public hears about such problems much earlier than we hear about ours because the Japanese are extremely sensitive to them and consider even very small numbers to be predictors and warning signs. There are reports of increasing violence against teachers and parents, shoplifting and paint thinner sniffing. The currently well-publicized incidence of *ijime* or bullying (chiefly in middle schools) is said to be the product of high pressure and conformity in schools and, while statistically still low, is said to predict a moral and intellectual decline. Where few other resources exist, the development of human resources is of vital importance and any strain in the population being educated is seen to present risk.

Our educational rhetoric does invoke "the whole child", does seek "self-expression" and does promote engagement in "discovery learning." But Japanese teaching style, at least in primary schools, effectively employs a nurturant, engaging, challenging and sensitive teaching style

which surpasses most American attempts. In the cubing class, I was struck by the spontaneity, excitement, and, to American eyes, "unruly" dedication of the children to the new idea, and impressed with the teacher's ability to create this positive mood. There is a cultural difference here: we tend to separate learning and feeling and then, hearing from psychologists that it's good to have them together, to devise means of reintroducing, rather artificially, "feeling" into learning. It is rather like the way canned fruit juices are produced: first denatured by the preserving process and then topped up with chemical vitamins to replace what was lost.

Culture, not in the sense of frozen "tradition", but in the sense I think we are using in this meeting of active, changing and influential values--the roots--is certainly an important factor in the educational process in Japan, and here, too. We should not assume that there is only one way to be modern, nor that the maintenance of culture is the preservation of OLD and outdated things. Roots are alive, grow too along with the tree, and continue to shape the growth of the future branches. The Japanese are most keenly aware of this, and continue to pass on to their children both implicitly and explicitly those values that, they feel, will make them both members of a culture called "Japanese" and successful modern people.

RESPONDENT: Victor Kobayashi, University of Hawaii

When Siegfried Ramler first discussed the topic of the conference, I happened to be hungry, so when he mentioned the word "roots," I immediately thought of carrots and radishes. And when he said "roots of Japanese behavior," I thought of *daikon*, *takuan*, and, of course that very very lengthy root, the *gobo*, the basis of the delectable *kimpira gobo*. I thought also that I could add to all the talk about Japanese uniqueness by talking about the wonderful *wasabi*, without which sushi would be unmarketable in New York. According to anthropologist E. N. Anderson, in his book, *The Food of China*, *wasabi* is distinctively Japanese. Many Japanese foods have origins in China, but the *wasabi* root is found only in Japan, along with the *myoga;* so *Nihonjin ron* junkies, please take note: the Japanese do have some wonderfully unique characteristics.

Merry White has ably summarized all that is wonderful about the relationships between Japanese mothers and their children, and between preschool and elementary school teachers and their students. These relationships help define character traits and thus help these traits to persist among Japanese from one generation to another. These traits also are expressed in the folk psychology of a society, and the folk psychology in turn reinforces the cultivation of the relationships. Thus a key to understanding the "roots of Japanese behavior" is to note the relationships involved in child-rearing and education of children, especially in their early years.

White considers items of Japanese behavior that Americans might be critical of, and that are interpreted by Americans as docility, obedience, dependence, and conformity, and places these items in a larger context so that they add on aspects that are quite positive, quite healthy, and quite conducive to strength of character--engagement in educational projects (and by extension in later years to engagement and commitment in the world of work). By such reframing of behavior, she balances the negative aspects of the Japanese character structure (which Americans are quick to notice) with the positive aspects (which the Japanese admire and do not want to give up). Her analysis also helps us understand the negative aspects of traits that Americans admire, often uncritically.

What is an *ii ko*? What is a good child? Dr. White points out that the Japanese in their folk psychology have terms to describe such a good child, terms such as:

otonashii—mild gentle
sunao—open and cooperative [docile, passive]
akarui—bright
genki—lively, spirited
hakihaki—brisk, prompt, clear
oriko—obedient, smart
yutaka—hearty, caring of others

Dependency:
Dependency is definitely encouraged in children by Japanese parents, while independence seems the goal of many American parents. Dependency is, of course, a natural state of all baby mammals (not just human beings) who need nurturance from at least one adult. Many American mothers try to

change that state of dependency at a very early age because we idealize independence, and encourage children to exhibit traits that indicate independence, and perhaps may lead some children to have a sense of insecurity. Japanese could be said to accept the child's state of dependency, and thus may be helping to make a child feel secure about being dependent. Americans, on the other hand, seek independence, which, when it means self-reliance, is a very admirable trait, but when it means avoidance of any reliance on others, may lead to alienation. Then, too, when Americans become elderly, they become more physically dependent on others, and it is difficult for many elderly Americans, addicted to being independent from early childhood, to accept a degree of dependence on others. I might mention also that the sense of insecurity is seen as a positive state, for Americans see this as a basis for motivation to achieve.

These observations on the comparative emphasis on dependence/independence in the U.S. and Japan are supported by a poll conducted in 1987 by The Japan Youth Research Institute, a private organization. The poll, based on samples of students in the U.S. and Japan, found that, while 1/3 of Japanese students wanted to become adults as soon as possible, 2/3 of American students wanted to become adults as soon as possible.

Group Affinity and Individualism:

Merry White also points out that much of school work, at least at the early stages, emphasizes affinal relationships, a strong emphasis on the ability to work together in group affinity rather than on individualistic activity. These traits again are related to the independence/dependence discussion in that the more independent a person is, the less the perceived need to be a part of the group. I remember once visiting a school chemistry laboratory where 5 students were conducting an experiment together--bunsen burner, glass test tubes, pouring chemicals, all in coordination, without getting in each other's way. It seemed that such situations would be rare in a white American classroom .

Many other examples can be found to illustrate this everyday trait of physically working in close coordination. I remember that twenty years ago, in Japanese department stores--before scotch tape began to be used to wrap packages -- I frequently was amazed to see as many as three girls

busily wrapping just one package without getting into each other's way.

Americans seem to want freedom of action for the individual, and groups often are perceived as hindering or restricting that freedom. The movement of the American pioneers into the "wild west" are part of the historic American myth that expresses this view of freedom. This idea of individual freedom is also related to notions of *laissez faire* competition between individuals. In the Japan Youth Research Institute report mentioned earlier, it was found that over 50% of American students believed that competition in a society was important in improving professional status and reputation, while only 27% of Japanese students thought so.

In the 60s when I met with Japanese educators who were at that time trying to sort out "American" values, many liked the idea of an education that aimed to develop "unique personalities and fostered individualism, but were concerned about the difference between egoism, selfishness, and individualism .

Immediate Presence:

Japanese emphasize close and immediate presence between mother and child, for the sake of being present. Tom Kasulis also pointed to this value of presence in his discussion of Japanese ways of thinking. Dog lovers would appreciate this idea. When you leave home everyday for work, even if you return predictably every day at around the same time, your dog nevertheless deeply misses your presence and may sulk and even howl and whine as you leave. Babies are the same, at first. We work hard to wean them so that they will accept the idea of us being away temporarily. They get weaned as they learn to distance themselves in their minds from immediate presence, by incorporating abstract notions that presence isn't important, and separation when you leave the child with the baby sitter isn't important because the parent will be back. We believe the child will get over it, and leaving the child doesn't necessarily mean that you don't care about the child. And of course that value becomes accepted.

Just being with the child is important for the Japanese, and most Japanese mothers practice that. (I think also that Americans are also rediscovering the importance of parents to be present with the child--among upper middle class circles, there is talk of "quality time" and in the

American literacy movement today, people are marketing the idea of parents spending more time reading to children while being with them.)

I remember when I coordinated a workshop led by psychologist Bruno Betelheim, one counselor told him that she worked with a child who was having behavior problems. The boy lived with his father in Hawaii after a divorce, while the mother moved to the mainland. The counselor told Betelheim that she tried to reassure the child that his mother still cared for him and pointed out how she sent the boy gifts from time to time. However, Betelheim told the counselor that she should help the child to accept the fact that his mother left him, rather than reassuring the child and attempting to deny the fact that his mother no longer was present.

At the same time, we know that children are very adaptable, and "quality time" may not necessarily be provided by the biological parent. Betelheim said that he was raised by a nurse, because, in Vienna at that time, it was acceptable for mothers to have a maid raise the children. Cultural acceptance of appropriate parent surrogates is thus an important factor.

Also, the weakness of an *exclusive* emphasis on affinal relationships and the emphasis only on immediate presence is that it removes the need for developing responsibility in children for a broader conception of groups beyond one's own immediate circle of relatives and close associates.

Children Innately Good:

Another claim made is that Japanese methods of discipline tend to be "love-oriented" rather than "power-assertive." Dr. White, along with other observers such as Dr. Joseph Tobill, points out that Japanese teachers and mothers assume that children want to be good, and thus approach them with this assumption. A child who is naughty is helped to be good. At least for younger children, teachers and mothers are more often coaches, rather than instructors or policemen. The mother's role is perceived as one that provides the appropriate supportive environment; abilities aren't innate, all is possible, and what is needed is effort. Mother creates a child willing to work hard. Thus in Japan, the idea is that adults set standards and then help students to reach them. The corresponding folk idea implicit

in American educational practice is to motivate students to find the standard best fitted to their individual needs. Americans tend to distrust anyone claiming to be the authority who sets the standards.

Japanese managers tend to assume that employees want to do well, and thus see their role as helping them to do better.

Now many of these ideas may not be uniquely Japanese; in fact, today many educators and parents and managers in the U.S. attempt to put this approach into everyday practice; but, as Merry White indicates, these views of the child seem more a part of everyday folk psychology for Japanese, than in the U.S.

This seems convincing to me, because we do know that America's early colonists, the Puritans, thought of children as being innately evil due to original sin, and education in the early days of New England (which was the region that pioneered in the establishment of public supported schools) originated out of the impulse to teach child to curb its evil nature. In Japan, on the other hand, the Puritan religious roots were absent. Children instead seemed to be viewed as godlike: naive, impulsive, and free of evil thoughts. The famous noh artist of the 5th century, Zeami, wrote in the *Kadensho* about *yugen* -- the basic and mysterious aesthetic quality of grace, beauty that a skilled noh actor conveyed, is a natural trait of the newborn child. He believed that as children get older, they lose that quality and that it must be re-acquired by each adult through effort and practice. The childish purity and style--the innocence, playfulness that has trust, faith, mystery, and lack of conscious purpose--must not be disturbed in the rearing of a child who will become a noh actor.

In presenting her picture of Japanese character structure and how it is nurtured, however, Merry White implicitly challenges the perceptions of many Americans as to what is considered to be good behavior. For example, she implicitly says that we Americans as a group are not as caring about children as the Japanese. Her depiction of Japanese behavior also comes at a time when many American women are struggling to rid themselves of the isolation that comes with being a full-time mother, while also trying to redefine gender differences in a culture that is perceived as being sexist. In Japan today, more and more women, too, including mothers, are entering the world of work, departing from the idea

that they must be always present and available for their young children. The role of women may still be unequal, but certainly, in Japan, the place of women in society is rapidly changing, such that White's depiction may no longer be applicable in the near future.

The Women's Research Council Report of 1988 in Japan reported that a 1976 poll found that 48.8% of women believed that only men should go out to work, while women should tend to the home. In 1987, however, the percentage of women who believed that only men should go out to work had dropped to 36.6 indicating that women's views about their role as housewives are changing. Another poll indicated that, in 1967, 30.6 percent of the men polled were in favor of women having a profession, but, in 1987, the percentage grew to 55 percent.

Americans are presently having many problems with how to bring up children. We are going through a transitional period in which we don't know exactly what to do; the Japanese seem to be moving towards an increase of similar problems, and Merry White's description today may increasingly require revision with each new generation of Japanese.

DISCUSSION & QUESTIONS:

MODERATOR (RAMLER): Let me start out the discussion with a question directed to Professor White. You painted a rather rosy picture of Japanese education, dealing with the nurturing phase in early childhood, the elementary environment, which is also very nurturing and positive. I was wondering if you would comment on what happens in secondary school, in particular when the final examination looms, when it becomes a tremendous challenge, and what happens to the creativity that we've been talking about when so much is measured by a test result, and very often a single test result. After that what happens at the undergraduate level, when having jumped that hurdle and reached the undergraduate level, students often just play around and have no focus at all. In other words, isn't there another side to this whole issue that is not as rosy and as positive as you've painted it?

WHITE: Of course there is a down side which I left out in order to complete in time. Thank you for letting me complete my talk. This negative view can be seen earlier than the secondary years for some

children whose parents are pushing them particularly hard, to try for Tokyo University, or other schools at the top of the pyramid of high-status, prestigious universities. The problems have now percolated down to junior high school, where we are beginning to see all kinds of pressure and stress-related symptoms in children. Junior high, as you know, is the end of compulsory education. You are not compelled to go on to high school, even though 94% of the children do finish high school. So the pressure for selection begins at the end of junior high at which time the process begins for entering a high school, depending on one's abilities. These are very young children, very young to experience the kind of stress that some parents are putting on them. Symptoms are appearing such as school phobias, psychosomatic disorders, and even incidents of what is called *ijime*, or bullying in the schools, particularly prevalent in the third year of middle school. So it's not just in the high schools, when the exams are looming immediately ahead, but even earlier. The examinations are a one-time life marker and the prestige of the university into which you pass becomes your basic status identity for life. It's not what you do in that university, but rather the status of that university. It's relatively easy to finish university in Japan. It's very difficult to get into one. They call the four years of university sometimes mo-ra-to-ri-um, i.e.,time off, and conventionally people have jokes about what kids are doing with their time off. It used to be mahjong that they played; now it's any number of things, more or less innocent. It is a time when you try to do all those things that you didn't do in high school. There was no dating in high school--social development as we call it. A lot of your hobbies had to be put aside during the tremendous crush in preparing for the examinations. Now I should say though that it's not everybody who is cramming or whose parents are spending huge amounts of money for the afternoon cram classes, and the *yobiko*. It is perhaps 10% of the school-aged population that is cramming for the most prestigious schools. But still, something of that pressure is felt by nearly every child, and, as you know, most parents feel they are middle class and do have the ambition to put their children into the best possible school. It's a very different picture from the American system, where what you do in college does count. And of course we have the idea that you can change directions at any time in your life and you are immensely portable. You

can leave behind difficult things in your past and transcend them. That's very hard to do in Japan.

QUESTION: I wanted to make the comment that I think it's important that we do comparative analysis between the Japanese child-rearing pattern and ours, although it's difficult to do it in such a brief period of time. A study conducted in UC Berkeley found that, in America, in a sample of parents and children, there were three kinds of child-rearing patterns--the authoritarian, *laissez-faire* and authoritative. The authoritarian pattern was heavy on discipline and light on warmth, the *laissez-faire* was heavy on warmth and light on discipline, and, in the authoritative area, it was a balance between warmth and discipline. In the authoritarian pattern, the end result was a dependent child, in the *laissez-faire* one, it was an immature child, and, in the authoritative, it was a competent, confident child. So my comment is, there's no single child-rearing pattern in this country. But then my question would be, having explained that, which of those three would be the closest to the Japanese pattern?

WHITE: I guess my initial reaction is to say "none of the above." I know this puts the burden on me, then, to come up with something else. I would say there is a combination here, and it is related to the stages of development, that are implied in the Japanese pedagogy. I think *laissez-faire* is too extreme a word to use for the Japanese kind of directive indulgence and authoritarian is much too deterministic a word for the kinds of expectations involved in the Japanese system. Authoritative can come close to certain kinds of teacher-student relations at different stages. As we were implying before, secondary education is very different from elementary school and nursery school education. In nursery school the main lesson of life is a social lesson. The main lesson of the school is doing things the right way and learning to understand other children. Cooperation is regarded so highly that when asked whether they wouldn't want smaller class size, instead of, for example, 42 to 1 which is the average, teachers said that they would not. They find that a smaller class is impossible, because you can't teach children true cooperation if you have 26 kids or 15 kids. They don't want an American ratio. They also deliberately have fewer toys than the number of children, so the children will learn to cooperate. There are things like this which I can't put into the kind of boxes that are implied by the typology you've given.

KOBAYASHI: Without elaborating too much, perhaps we should be looking at a larger ecology of the family and of the school. Take, for example, sex roles. The father might be authoritarian, and the mother might be indulgent. Traditionally, in Japan, the father tended to be more authoritarian, and the mother would be more nurturing and supportive. The relationship between the parents might also be another factor. Also, the mother might be more authoritarian to the daughter than to the son. These factors have to be taken into account, but at the same time we have to realize things are changing, too. Many young fathers are brought up on egalitarian ideals and feel they have to participate in cooking, and maybe bringing up the children. So suddenly there's no authority figure and the male is sharing the mother's part in bringing up the child.

QUESTION: To what extent do the geographies of the two countries, the U.S. and Japan, influence that closeness, the intimacy, that you talked about?

WHITE: Well, I don't know if it directly influences it so much. Perhaps one could struggle toward a definition of a character as the Japanese like to do. They say "We are a small island country, as opposed to the U.S. which is a frontier country which believes in the infinite and wide open spaces." But I think, when you come down to behavior, interpersonal behavior, you have to talk about more practical, intimate environments. Families after all are families, and live in houses. The space of an urban family's house in Japan which is much smaller than a typical American family's house does have something to do with how people treat each other. David Plath has written about the effect of being able to sleep together on *futon* that you can move from room to room. Or, because you can hear right through the partitions, you have to have a strategy for not seeing and not hearing things that you should not be seeing and hearing? Those types of things are often attributed to spatial or environmental questions, but I hesitate to get too deterministic about these issues.

JANSEN: I have a slightly different question. I wonder if one should not factor in the prestige accorded the teacher and the school in Japan as opposed to the more combative model in the U.S., in which the parents defend the child against the teacher.

WHITE: Yes, of course the teacher in Japan has traditionally and even

today been accorded a great deal of community status and respect. They tend not to be involved in a confrontational relationship with either child or parent. There is much more accord between the administration and faculties in schools than there is typically in the American schools. They also have of course better pay, job security, and the chance to upgrade themselves. It is a high prestige position so that a larger number of young people who have good degrees from good universities go into teaching. There are a lot of ways in which teaching is an enhanced profession. It does not obtain, sadly, for our teachers. And that goes along with the consensus that says schooling is a good thing and that what goes on at school is important. All of this is a tremendous support to the practice of teaching.

LEBRA: I think most of the time, in most cases, child rearing is the mother's responsibility. The mother monopolizes child rearing, or they are forced to because the father is absent. When both parents participate in childrearing, I think there is a tendency for the parental roles to be different. For example, when one parent emphasizes discipline, or authoritarian discipline, then the other tends to indulge the child. And the child could be either male or female. The *kyoiku mama* may be reacted against, or countered by the indulgent father--or the other way around. You know, you have *kyoiku papas* too, i.e. very disciplinary, and the mother may likewise compensate for this.

MODERATOR (RAMLER): *Kyoiku papa* means education father and *kyoiku mama* means education mother.

LEBRA: Why do they tend to be different instead of giving the same message? I think there are different reasons. One is this strong belief in the division of labor. Two people shouldn't be doing the same thing, particularly when they are different in gender; i.e. it is thought that they have to be different. And it's a very, very conservative force. That's a structural explanation. Another is that, on one end of the continuum, one parent is more emotional. There may be marital estrangement, and by being different, by countering the other party, you may be expressing your own hostility toward your spouse. Of course there are many, many estranged couples in Japan, as well as in U.S., although they don't end up in divorce as much as in U.S.

TANABE: Professor White, when I lived in Japan, it seemed as though

up to the age of seven, there were very simple principles that were dictated in child discipline, and then it changed afterwards.

WHITE: It used to be that especially boys had a clear marker indicating when they came to the age of, not necessarily reason, but of responsibility. Then suddenly the discipline was applied and there was a great discontinuity between an early childhood and that moment. It's a little different now, because of what parents perceive as the need to study hard. The mothers like to give the child a soft home environment because of the rough, highly disciplined learning they will go through to pass the school entrance examinations. There has been an extension of indulgence now, past that earlier conventional time of taking responsibility. It's a little different for girls. They were expected to be responsible much earlier. In traditional farm families, of course, the girls took on tasks as early as they could, even taking care of younger siblings or doing chores in the house. Girls experienced more continuity in their developmental socialization than boys.

I would just like to say in conclusion that, based on seeing Japanese adolescence over a period of over 20 years on a very regular basis, there's one conclusion, i.e. it is not as easy to generalize now as it seemed to be even 20 years ago. You will find a tremendous amount of diversity among the young people today that is characteristic of a rapidly changing society. So for that reason we've got to be very careful, I think, about any generalizations that we make on this topic.

KATO: I just want to give you one factual piece of information. Whenever we talk about education, immediately the association is to institutionalized school education. But July 1988 is a landmark in the history of Japanese education and Japanese educational philosophy. On that day, a new bureau called "Lifelong Learning Bureau" turned out to be the top bureau in the Ministry of Education. The implication is very profound, in the sense that it was not called the "Lifelong Education Bureau," but the "Lifelong Learning Bureau." The implication is that there are millions of people who are taking continuing education, including flower arrangement and other domestic arts, as well as studying foreign languages, Western philosophy. At the same time, Japanese businesses are investing, according to the government's survey, approximately an equivalent of 40 billion dollars a year for research and

development for on-the-job training. That amount of money exceeds the budget allocated to all the national universities and research institutions. I was very impressed by Merry White's presentation and Victor Kobayashi's comments on early childhood and school education, but we should be reminded that school education as such is coming to a turning point. The trend seems to indicate that continuing education is getting more emphasis than early childhood education.

V. JAPANESE INTERNATIONALIZATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Koichi Kabayama, University of Tokyo

In today's Japan a controversy exists in the economic, political and cultural fields. Journalists call it the "opening vs. isolation" debate. The debate started about two or three years ago, but this summer it gathered an ever growing vehemence.

The main subject is as follows: Should the Japanese labor market accept foreign job seekers or not? Traditionally, Japan has excluded foreign workers with the exception of skilled persons, e.g. musicians, professional baseball players, etc. Recently, however, attracted by the miraculous growth of the Japanese economy, many foreigners have eagerly sought jobs in Japan. Many come especially from the East and Southeast Asian countries. Japanese entrepreneurs welcome this new source of cheap labor. This August, many Vietnamese and South-Chinese boat people made the long journey to Japan in the guise of political refugees. This fueled the debate between isolation and opening.

Advocates of opening vary concerning their reasons for accepting foreign workers. Some say it is a basic human right to be able to select one's living and working place and this should be respected. Others say that economically prosperous countries such as Japan have an obligation to accept surplus labor from neighboring underdeveloped countries.

On the other hand, isolation advocates reject the optimistic idea of the opening theory. They say that in the economic recession predicted to come in the near future a great wave of unemployment will occur in which foreign workers will suffer more severely and the resulting economic disorder will destroy Japan's stability. As in the case of West Germany, the introduction of foreign workers may lead to undesirable results in the national economy and society.

Nowadays, each side claims it is right. The controversy concerns actual policy making; however it has a historical background. I'd like to consider two aspects of this background. First, geopolitically, Japan is situated along the eastern side of the Eurasian continent. Japanese history has been played out on these islands, secluded from the outside. The

nearest country with which Japan has had intimate contact is Korea. Also, Japan has been greatly influenced by China, both politically and culturally, but was not swallowed up by her giant neighbor. Even if in early Japanese history few centralized powers ruled the islands, civil wars were uncommon. Later, from the 7th century onward, there existed a sole political authority which ruled almost all the Japanese islands.

Totally separated by sea from the outer world, Japan has had few experiences of violent outside aggression. Only one military crisis occurred in its pre-modern period. This was the Mongolian expedition commanded by Khublai Khan, the grandson of Genghis Khan in the 13th century. The Mongols were twice driven back by Japanese soldiers aided by stormy typhoons which Japanese call *kamikaze* or "divine winds." Only once was Japan occupied militarily. This was after the defeat in World War II 44 years ago. As an island country, it has enjoyed a geographical advantage--the Pacific Ocean and surrounding seas have protected these isolated Japanese islands. Conversely, Japan has seldom tried to attack foreign territories, with the major exception in the 20th century when Japan occupied Korea, Taiwan, etc. under imperialistic colonialism. After having been beaten thoroughly in WWII, we abandoned once and for all any desire for territorial overseas expansion.

The British islands present a comparative geographical example. In modern times, Britain has twice repulsed military assailants--Napoleon and Hitler--aided by her geographical position.

The second aspect I would like to discuss is the debate between the opening and isolation theories which goes back to a similar one taking place about 135 years ago when Admiral Perry visited Japan with his four black vessels (*kurofune*). In the first half of the 17th century, the Japanese government adopted a national isolation policy which they called "sakoku." Driven by fear of the intrusion of Christianity, the Tokugawa authorities strictly prohibited entry by foreigners into Japan either for commercial or religious purposes. At the same time, all Japanese were prohibited from traveling abroad. Only Dutch and Chinese ships were permitted to enter the port of Nagasaki, on the western fringe of the Japanese islands, but under severely limited conditions.

In 1853, Perry knocked on the door of Japan which had been closed for about 220 years. Japanese people were seized in a sudden panic.

Feudal lords, under the *Shogunate*, lesser feudal vassals and the common samurai warriors joined in the debate. They contested controversial questions regarding the opening of Japan. Opening vs. isolation advocates fought with each other. In 1854, the Japanese government decided to accept a U.S. proposal to open the door and thus Japan's first modern treaty was concluded.

Violent protest flared up. Anti-government movements appeared. Anti-foreign sentiment increased. Several foreigners already settled in Japan were killed. This chauvinistic stance, which they called *joi*, prevailed and the Tokugawa government failed to persuade their subjects to accept an open door policy. The government lasted only ten more years before it collapsed. Then in 1868 came the Meiji Restoration.

The Tokugawa government opened Japan to the outer world and its opponents seized political power. Strangely enough, the new Meiji government turned around and promoted international relationships with U.S. and European countries.

Considering the geographical and historical conditions mentioned above, several general historical characteristics underlie Japanese behavior and attitudes towards international relations. Four points should be emphasized. First, in particular historical situations, Japan chose a strict isolation policy. In addition to the Tokugawa period, Japan has experienced complete isolation two other times--the late Heian era (10th and 11th centuries), and the World War II period from 1941 to 1945. The Japanese islands were cut off completely from the outer world and they enjoyed a happy (or unhappy?) isolation. Once negative opinions about international intercourse prevailed, the Japanese dashed quickly into extreme isolation, made easier by their geographical location as an island country. This tendency holds good even in contemporary Japan.

It goes without saying that we would be hardpressed to find similar examples in the European countries (except for Great Britain). On the other hand, Japan's neighbor, China, under the Ch'ing dynasty of the Manchurians and Korea under the Ri-tsi dynasty, also closed the door to European visitors around the 17th to the late 19th century. They all looked down on foreigners as "barbarians from the south" (*namban*).

Secondly, the opening of the door to international relations was forced by *gaiatsu* (outside pressure). Opening did not mean a self-

motivated decision, but Japan opened itself reluctantly, against its will. Opening was painful. Only the government authorities felt compelled to open the door. The Tokugawa Shogunate opened the country under the military pressure of the U.S. Navy; then in the next few years, it was forced to do so again by other European countries. These countries had already had their industrial revolutions and were now seeking new markets in Asia. The Japanese populace was antagonistic towards foreigners and did not understand the world situation or the nature of the outside pressure exerted on the government. They hated foreigners and perceived their own government as an accomplice to them. This was the case 130 years ago. A similar scene can be witnessed in today's Japan. Faced with outside pressure, the government adopted an open policy against its will, giving way to the "strong wind of internationalization." Contemporary Japanese, especially village farmers, greatly fear this outside pressure. They see the U.S. demand for the free trade of rice, beef, oranges, etc. as unreasonable.

The third point is closely related to the second. After the great controversy prior to the Meiji Restoration, Japan still continued to suffer from inner conflicts and antagonism over diplomatic policy. In the meantime, in the latter half of the 19th century, the world saw an inclination toward free trade. With Great Britain as its leader, France, the U.S. and other industrializing countries made way for free trade. They believed firmly that growing world-wide free trade would promote human welfare, in advanced countries as well as in backward ones. Free trade advocates had struggled fiercely with their opponents who espoused protectionism since the beginning of the 19th century and gradually had gained the upper hand.

Japan had entered into the growing world system of free trade without being fully aware of it. In Meiji Japan, there was little understanding of the current debate between free trade versus protectionism. Rather, they discussed economic or commercial relations with foreign countries in terms of outer pressures and governmental means to meet them, not in terms of national and international economic welfare. In the opening vs. isolation controversy in contemporary Japan, we can also find the same feature, ie., an indifference to the question of free trade vs protection which is a crucial issue in modern international relations.

Lastly, we should note the development of an isolation theory in

the Meiji era. Contrary to expectation, modernization and westernization advanced rapidly, imports paralleling exports as Japan marched into an international context. On the other hand, strong reactions against westernization arose. Without disapproving of actual economic or diplomatic relationships, opponents of westernization insisted on the maintenance of pure national characteristics. In their view, national characteristics involved behavior, worldview, sentiment, etc. which are the traditional inheritance of Japanese culture. Above all, it was thought that language should occupy a leading position. As the spiritual/mystical core of literature and the main vehicle for personal communication, it was felt that language plays a decisive role in the formation of national character or culture and that Japanese language should not be transformed or damaged by exterior influences of other languages. From a linguistic viewpoint then, Japanese really holds a very peculiar, unique and isolated position. We may call these opinions "cultural isolationism." This type of argument seen in the Meiji era continues to flourish even in the 20th century. Nowadays, extreme advocates of isolation usually cling to the pure tradition or Japanese culture.

From an historical point of view, Japanese culture was enriched during the period of isolation. For example, under the strict isolation of the Tokugawa era, we can point to much development in art and literature--*ukiyoe* (woodblock prints), the 17 syllable haiku poem, and the kabuki drama. Liberated from the difficult problems of diplomacy and inner conflict, samurai, the bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and even common people engaged in cultural pursuits in their own way. All these artistic achievements and products derived their originality from national tradition, purely preserved and cultivated without support from the outside. There appeared a mixture or exchange between the high culture of the elite classes and popular culture (or counter culture), which may be one of the most characteristic features of Japanese culture. In one word, isolation gave birth to a genuine national culture. Following these observations, some demand that contemporary Japanese culture return to isolation again.

To conclude, we need to emphasize a close connection and continuity between the opening versus isolation debate of 130 years ago and that of today. Against this historical background, we will be able to explore the origin and roots of Japanese behavior in an era of

internationalization. My historical analysis may raise some questions or doubts in an American audience. Is there any real sign or possibility of change in today's Japan? Has its close contact with foreign countries especially with the U.S. in no way changed Japanese attitudes in the past 44 years? In such a highly developed borderless economy, will Japanese successfully continue to maintain their traditional behavior?

We can easily find clear signs of change. In spite of the reluctance with which Japan accepts outside pressure and the strong persistence of attitudes of cultural isolation, it is forced to communicate with foreign countries. According to official statistics, more than ten million Japanese traveled abroad in 1988. About two million people traveled to Japan. These travelers are ambassadors of Japanese culture abroad as well as importers of foreign cultures, respectively. In the area of trade, we know very well that the worldwide trade network has already absorbed our country with the result that Japan cannot survive without the international exchange of materials. Petroleum, wheat, wool, iron ore, even shrimp which Japanese people love so much, are almost entirely imported. To top this off, Japan has dashed into the sphere of internationalization of information. In an era of highly developed communication technology, we are surrounded with voluminous information from the outside world. Despite being relatively more secluded from the outside than other countries, Japan receives an enormous amount of information, not only from the U.S., western Europe, and other countries with which we have close contact, but also from Africa, Latin America, and the eastern European countries. Moreover, through satellite T.V. broadcasting, international telephone, and facsimile, information has become immediately accessible.

In these circumstances, the Japanese are undergoing a great change. They feel forced to jump into internationalization as if opening a firmly locked door. Beyond the raging controversy between opening vs. isolation, sooner or later, the majority of Japanese people will accept an opening in the field of trade, labor market and cultural exchange. We cannot deny that these changes will come in the near future in Japan.

One problem remains, however. In the last one hundred years or so in Japan, internationalization has meant simply and uniformly "westernization" and closer contacts with European countries and the U.S.

Rarely did it imply relationships with Asian and African countries. This seems very natural and inevitable if we consider the historical background I mentioned above. In this area, a great transformation must occur. Economically and culturally Japan has developed relationships with the third world, both neighboring countries and remote. This new situation will impose a heavy responsibility on the Japanese. Japanese have tended to show an indifference towards these countries and peoples. Sometimes, we detect an attitude of contempt. In the Meiji period, this sentiment was expressed in the terms *datsua-nyuo* which means "out of Asia, into Europe." Frankly speaking, we Japanese are struggling against our own attitudes, very deeply rooted in modern Japanese history.

RESPONDENT: Edward Seidensticker, University of Hawaii, Center for Japanese Studies.

One of the ideas that has emerged from our deliberations in general is that a great deal we say about the Japanese is not uniquely Japanese. The Japanese think of themselves as a unique people, and of course they are a unique people, because every people is a unique people. The Japanese mistake is in thinking that they are the only unique people in the world. They think they are uniquely unique. Well, we're unique, too.

Turning to Professor Kabayama's remarks, I am very happy to have the opportunity to comment on his paper. In reference to Japanese wavering between isolationism and opening out upon the world, Professor Kabayama states "It goes without saying that we can hardly find out a similar example in European countries, except Great Britain." I think quite on the contrary, this is a very common phenomenon. It's found the world over. Certainly we have it in the United States. Alternating between isolationism and internationalism has been a constant, a continuing factor in American psychology and American feelings about the world. In the 1930s, isolationism was very strong. I think that was probably true in my part of the United States and all the way across the great Mississippi basin. The two coasts were more internationalized and, for that reason, the world may have the notion that America was a more strongly internationalist country in those years than very large segments

of it really were. I imagine, the German problem we keep hearing about might not be a problem of isolationism. Germany, since the Second World War, has made its opening to the West, as a good and faithful partner in the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance. But then we have the other side, Brandt and Genscher and the opening to the East. My main point is that, this may seem to be a uniquely Japanese phenomenon, but I think it's a really very common one, certainly in the United States, and I would suspect in Germany, too.

Regarding the phenomenon of language, Professor Kabayama is perfectly correct when he says that in Japan, the Japanese language occupies a unique position culturally. Defensiveness about one's language, however, is also by no means uniquely Japanese. Look at the French and the ferocity with which they fight for the purity of their language and the intensity with which they think of their language as the center of everything, without which they will cease to be.

I'm not as optimistic as Professor Jansen; I think there are very great cultural barriers between us. There are customary and institutional matters that are extremely difficult and which cannot be easily explained away. There are limits to understanding. Professor Lebra used the expression exclusiveness. The exclusiveness of the Japanese is a very distinguishing Japanese trait, and one which makes them exceedingly difficult to deal with. Professor White used the expression *uchi* and *soto*, the inside and the outside, i.e. us and them. The us and the them run all through the Japanese language, and of course the language determines your ways of thought. The Japanese language is so organized that you cannot use a pronoun without indicating us as against them. The common pattern is when you choose a pronoun, you either choose a pronoun for us or a pronoun for them, and the distinction between the two runs all through Japanese culture. The sunny assumption upon which this conference is implicitly based is that what we need to do is to understand. Well, of course we need to understand; it's in everybody's interest to understand everything we possibly can; but will understanding solve all of our problems? I certainly am not at all sure that it will. To understand all is to forgive all. It's one of those proverbial sayings that we accept without thinking; but if we think about it for a minute, it's just not true. I think through the labors of Hannah Arendt, we understand Naziism

pretty well, but that doesn't mean we forgive it. Nor does it mean that, when we understand it, the problem will go away.

Professor Kabayama says that Japan was completely isolated and he uses the expression "cut off perfectly from the outer world." When he uses this with regard to the Second World War, he can only mean cut off from the West, because Japan in those years was certainly not cut off from China, Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, or Indonesia. Then he proceeds to say that this holds good even in contemporary Japan. I think this is perfectly true. I mean that I think that there are a lot of Japanese who feel this way. Professor Kabayama seems to look rather nostalgically back to the age of isolation. He dwells upon the Tokugawa period as one of the great periods of Japanese culture. The early Tokugawa period was, but the late Tokugawa period, in the 18th and early 19th centuries, when the effects of isolation were being felt, I believe, was one of the poorest periods in Japanese culture. Japanese literature of the 18th and early 19th centuries was pretty poor stuff. The great flower, the great glory of the 18th and 19th centuries, is without question the kabuki which we have to admit is pretty grand. The *ukiyoe* woodblock print wasn't highly regarded by the Japanese until Westerners started admiring it. I'm inclined to think the Japanese were right in not thinking highly of it. It's on the whole a rather poor period in Japanese culture If this is the great achievement of isolation, then once again, a wish to go back to it is somehow mentally, and I think emotionally, unbalanced. In other words, it is the problem of living with mental illness and understanding it, but not having it go away.

After having deliberated the question about whether Japan is changing or not, Professor Kabayama answers in the affirmative. That they are undergoing a change is true. A society inevitably undergoes change. How rapidly are they changing? I think the pace of change is extremely slow. If it is institutional change we are pressing the Japanese towards, we have a very tough problem ahead of us, and it will take a very long time.

I wonder if I caught at the end of Professor Kabayama's remarks a touch of pan-Asianism. I'm not sure I did--but just faintly, redolently, there, somewhere in the background. I would say in this regard only that pan-Asianism has had a very unhappy history, and that we should be

careful about it. Thank you.

DISCUSSION & QUESTIONS:

MODERATOR (RAMLER): This last topic has dealt with dilemmas, tensions, and challenges. I wonder whether some comments could be directed toward this next step. What are the challenges now posed to us? In view of what is going on now--Japan-bashing at one extreme, to being conciliatory at the other extreme--how might we approach the issues? Would anyone like to comment?

QUESTION: From what I hear and read in the mass-media, Japan's decision-making power is still very much in the hands of the older generation. If we are looking for change, maybe we must look to the younger generation and to the future. It seems that Japanese youth tend to idealize and imitate Western music, dress, etc. What will happen when they take over the job of running the country?

SAKAI: I think there is a dilemma in the general population. In the first place, Japanese have always been fascinated with foreign things. A lot of this could be fadism. They are fascinated with the modern music we have in our country, music I have trouble understanding. They are the very first to adopt fashions from the outside, much faster than we do in Hawaii. This is a rather superficial level. Historically, ideas were taken in from the West, or from China in the earlier days. Anything from China in the early seventh century, or eighth century, was good. Then it took about 150 years to filter down and eventually become Japanese. The same is true of the Meiji period. Anything Western initially was adopted uncritically because they didn't know what was good or was bad. They had to experience it. By the 1880s, they began to appreciate what they wanted and what they didn't want. I think the same thing happens today. Everybody wants to have the latest thing, the latest fashion, but there comes a time of judgment. There may well be a reaction in the near future, particularly among the older generation.

SEIDENSTICKER: The observation that the youth of the country are changing radically, and therefore the country's changing radically, is something I've heard ever since I went to Japan, which was just after the war. Young people thronged to the Ginza and people said, "My aren't

they different, they're so liberated, so open, they're so expressive of their emotions." This was in the late 1940s, but you know what happened then. They left the Ginza, put on their business suits, and 20 years later they are exactly like their papas. Now there is change, there's no question about that, and now perhaps we are witnessing the biggest change. The young gather in Yoyogi park and make noise on Sunday night, and oh how they do make noise, too! Maybe it is the big change, who knows--but it's been going on for so long, each new group of youth is greeted with the same salute. You know, "Oh, isn't it nice that you're so liberated," and each new group of youth throws off its blue denims, puts on its business suits, and turns out to be exactly the same. Now, as to whether this is the big change or not, all I can say is I don't know. We just have to wait and see. It could be; who knows?

KATO: First of all, to respond to the question about the younger generation, we often tend to confuse three different concepts. One is age, another is era, i.e. a particular time in history, and the third is generation. I think the same is true also in the United States. Some 20 years ago I saw many young people with long hair, wearing blue jeans and playing rock music. Now they wear grey flannel suits, call themselves yuppies, and carry briefcases to work on Madison Avenue. The same thing happens in Japan. Any culture is strong enough to keep that kind of tradition. It goes beyond generation. That is the strength of culture.

The current topic now is internationalization (*kokusaika*). I think we have all bought one-way tickets. We don't have a return ticket back to isolationism. There is no turning back. *Kokusaika* for me means the interdependence among nations. Take food, for example. 60% of our food supply comes from abroad. We often joke that, in our favorite dish, *tempura soba* (noodles with fried shrimp), the only Japanese ingredient you will find is the water. This is because *soba* is now grown in Brazil and Africa, the wheat is from the United States and Canada, the shrimp is caught off-shore in Mexico, and the oil, corn and other crops are grown in the United States and Canada. Soy sauce seasoning is made in Wisconsin. So we are very international every time we eat a bowl of *soba* noodles. We only contribute the water. Since we cannot grow enough agricultural products in our country, we can never go back to isolationism. The pendulum will not swing the other way now.

PARTICIPANTS

Marius B. Jansen is Professor of Japanese History at Princeton University. Author of *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization* and *Japan and Its World: Two Centuries of Change*. Research interests include institutional, intellectual, political history, Sino-Japanese relations; Tokugawa period to the present.

Koichi Kabayama is Associate Professor, University of Tokyo, Faculty of Letters. Author of *Cultural History of Communication; Emergence of Europe; Perspective on Renaissance* (all in Japanese).

Thomas P. Kasulis is Professor of Philosophy and Religion, Northland College, Ashland, Wisconsin. Author of *Zen Action/Zen Person*. Current work is on the evolution of the Japanese world view from the eighth through twentieth centuries. Research specialization is Japanese philosophy and religion and comparative philosophy.

Hidetoshi Kato is Director, National Institute of Multi-Media Education, Chiba, Japan. Has also taught sociology at Gakushuin University and the University of the Air and was research associate, Institute for Humanistic Studies, Kyoto University. Research in progress on cultural diffusion in East and Southeast Asia and comparative urban sociology.

Victor N. Kobayashi is Professor of Education and Dean of the Summer Session, University of Hawaii. Author of *Educational Policy in Crisis; Japanese and American Perspectives* and *John Dewey in Japanese Educational Thought*. Research interests include history and problems of Japanese educational system.

Takie Sugiyama Lebra is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Hawaii. Author of *Japanese Patterns of Behavior and Japanese Women; Constraint and Fulfillment*. Research interests include culture and interpersonal relations, self and personhood.

Siegfried Ramler is Director of Instruction and Curriculum at Punahou School and Director of Punahou's Wo International Center. He is a past President of the Japan-America Society of Honolulu and its current

Program Chairman.

Robert K. Sakai is Professor Emeritus of Japanese History, University of Hawaii. Editor of *The Status System and Social Organization of Satsuma* and contributor to *Encyclopedia of Asian History* and *Encyclopedia of Japan*. Also taught at University of Nebraska and was Curator, Gannett Fellows Program for Journalists.

Edward G. Seidensticker is Professor Emeritus of Japanese, Columbia University. Author of *Kafu the Scribbler* and *Low City, High City*. Translator of *The Tale of Genji*. Has also taught at Stanford University and University of Michigan.

George J. Tanabe is Assistant Professor of Religion, University of Hawaii. Publications include *The Lotus Sutra in Japanese Culture* (co-editor). Research interests include early Kamakura Buddhism, history of Shingon Buddhism.

Merry I. White is Associate Professor of Sociology, Boston University. Author of *The Japanese Overseas and The Japanese Educational Challenge: A Commitment to Children*. Formerly Director of International Education, Harvard Graduate School of Education. Recent Social Science Research Council grant for study of emerging cultural concepts of adolescence in Japan.